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Psychological closure is the feeling that a life experience is complete and a part of 
the past (Beike, Adams, and Wirth-Beaumont 2007). While research on psychological 
closure primarily deals with traumatic or highly aversive life experiences, psychological 
closure is frequently experienced and sought after in more typical consumption settings. 
My dissertation extends our current knowledge about the role of psychological closure by 
exploring emotional, cognitive, perceptual, and behavioral implications of psychological 
closure across a broad range of consumer experiences. The first essay aims to demonstrate 
that closure makes events seem distant in time and probability through emotion. It also 
explores resulting consumer decisions such as warranty purchase intentions. The second 
essay proposes and tests how psychological closure of a consumer learning experience can 
lead to an abstract representation of that learning experience, and consequently a 
heightened sense of subjective knowledge. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Amy: I’ve come up with a series of exercises to help with your compulsive need for closure.   
Sheldon: What? I take issue with the word compulsive. 
Amy: All I’m saying is, we live in a world where closure isn’t always an op… 
Sheldon: [annoyingly waits for Amy to finish her sentence] …TION! OK! 
– From a Big Bang Theory episode “The Closure Alternative” 
 
Psychological closure is the feeling that an experience is complete and a part of the 
past (Beike et al. 2007). Closure is also generally regarded as a desired end state (Beike 
2002), as many people might resonate with Sheldon’s character in the above scene from 
the Big Bang Theory. The lack of closure, on the other hand, can have negative 
consequences such as increased uncertainty, self-analysis, and rumination (Beike, 
Kleinknecht, and Wirth-Beaumont 2004). 
With closure being an important and desirable psychological state, understanding 
the role of closure may be more important than ever for marketers and managers in the 
modern era. The significant growth of experiential goods consumption and increased 
interest in successful customer service and relationship (Sprague 2009; Wagner 2012) 
suggest that providing consumers with a proper sense of ending or resolution may have 
significant value. There are numerous examples of negative experiences that consumers 
may want to move on from such as service failures, product-related accidents or recalls, 
and painful medical treatments. Positive consumer events such as vacations, hobby 
activities, and learning experiences can also vary in the degree of closure they provide. 
Thus, depending on the goal, a manager could decide to facilitate or delay the experience 
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of closure to help their consumers move on from or prolong their relationship with a 
product or service. 
My dissertation consists of two essays that examine different consequences of 
psychological closure. The first essay examines the role of closure in creating 
psychological distance and restoring future expectations after a negative consumer 
experience. The second essay examines the effect of closure on mental representation and 
perceived expertise in the context of consumer learning. To provide a theoretical 
background for my dissertation, I will first review the previous literature. I will begin with 
an introduction to the concept of closure as a psychological construct. Then I will move on 
to explaining the current knowledge about the antecedents and consequences of 
psychological closure. 
CLOSURE AS A PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSTRUCT 
Clinical dictionaries define closure a comforting or satisfying sense of finality, 
while the origin of the word can be traced back to the Latin word clausus, which means to 
close, confine, or block. People say they “have closure” in a variety of situations such as 
after watching a satisfying finale of a TV series (Nussbaum 2013), finding peace of mind 
regarding a previous romantic relationship (Eads 2008), or knowing that a dangerous 
terrorist has been captured (Londono and Williams 2011). These seemingly different 
events commonly relate to a realization that a series of moments that constitute a 
meaningful unit have come to an end. This sense of finality, because it enhances 
perceptions of wholeness and completeness, could enable individuals to “close” that part 
of their life. The notion that people see life events as objects in space they can contain is 
supported by the idea that our psychological states are grounded in our bodily experiences 
(Barsalou 2008). Hence, people feel as though they can move on from the past, bury a 
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memory, or close a chapter of their lives. Indeed, previous studies have demonstrated that 
feelings of closure can be induced by performing physical acts associated with closure such 
as sealing objects in an envelope or closing the lid (Gu, Botti, and Faro 2013; Li, Wei, and 
Soman 2010). People also set up and attend ritualistic events to feel a sense of closure 
(Brenner 2011; Lloyd 2011; Tavernise 2011). 
In the academic literature, the experience of closure has been conceptualized as a 
state of psychological resolution or equilibrium that enables people to attend to other 
problems or concerns (Gold and Faust 2002; Skitka, Bauman, and Mullen 2004). As such, 
lack of closure can make people feel unresolved tension that prevent them from moving on 
(Savitsky, Medvec, and Gilovich 1997). This theory related to a tension resolution 
mechanism may explain why people eagerly seek answers despite the potential benefits of 
leaving positive events open-ended (Wilson et al. 2005). However, as a definition, 
psychological equilibrium or tension resolution does not capture the essential aspect of the 
closure experience which is the perception that one is sealing off or containing a part of 
their past. Rather, psychological equilibrium seems to be one of the many antecedents or 
consequences of closure. In other words, psychological equilibrium is a psycho-
physiological process associated with the experience of closure rather than the experience 
of closure itself. To more closely capture the closure experience, I define psychological 
closure as a mental segmentation process which isolates a given event out of the subjective 
portfolio of ongoing experiences. Thus, achieving closure on an event means the event is 
no longer perceived as an ongoing experience, but is rather sealed in a mental space as a 
completed whole. Psychological equilibrium or resolved tension can certainty facilitate or 
enable this mental segmentation process, and it can also be a key consequence of 
psychological closure. 
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Given the similarity in their labels, one may naturally wonder how psychological 
closure relates to the need for cognitive closure (NFCC; Kruglanski and Webster 1996; 
Webster and Kruglanski 1994). Moreover, distinguishing these two constructs helps clarify 
the meaning of psychological closure and highlight the unique characteristics of the 
psychological closure experience. Need for cognitive closure refers to a motivational state 
in which an individual seeks to quickly seize a definite answer rather than leaving 
information ambiguous. This is apparent in the questions of the NFCC scale, asking the 
extent to which respondents agree with statements such as “I dislike questions which could 
be answered in many different ways; when I am confronted with a problem, I’m dying to 
reach a solution very quickly.” As these examples illustrate, NFCC refers to individuals’ 
need to immediately achieve closure in the cognitive domain. 
While no research to date has examined the relationship between psychological 
closure and cognitive closure, theoretically, cognitive closure would be one way in which 
people could experience psychological closure because it is a specific type of closure 
related to cognitive satisfaction. Reducing uncertainty is a basic human motivation (Hogg 
2000; Tobin and Raymundo 2010; Wilson et al. 2005) and thus, increased uncertainty 
rising from ambiguous information can bring tension and lack of closure. That is, the quest 
for certainty is likely to make an event very much an ongoing experience, rather than 
allowing it to be isolated out as a completed whole. In other words, lacking cognitive 
closure may naturally diminish experiences of psychological closure. However, it is 
important to note that psychological closure can be experienced and sought after even when 
there is no information uncertainty, suggesting the two are different constructs. Recall the 
opening quote where Sheldon becomes irritated by Amy not completing her sentence, and 
so feels that he must complete it for her. He already knows the complete sentence, but it 
irritates him to hear it in its incomplete form. In other words, holding information or 
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knowledge constant, one can independently have or lack closure, as I will consistently 
demonstrate in the studies of this dissertation. 
Now I turn to review the current body of knowledge regarding the psychological 
effects of closure and how the experience of closure manifests. 
CONSEQUENCES OF CLOSURE 
People often say they “need closure” or that they “have closure” after a traumatic 
life event. Therefore, it is not surprising the majority of research on psychological closure 
focuses on the resolution of negative emotions. For example, studies have shown that 
psychological closure makes individuals feel less saddened by tragic news and less 
regretful about past decisions (Li et al. 2010). Likewise, a high sense of closure makes 
individuals less frustrated after solving a series of difficult and partially insoluble puzzles 
and helps them move on rather than reengage (Beike et al. 2007). 
The experience of psychological closure, as mentioned earlier, is not limited to 
aversive life events and can be observed in a broader range of consumer experiences, 
including positive ones. For example, Beike and Wirth-Beaumont (2005) asked 
participants to recall open and closed memories of both positive and negative life events in 
order to show that more emotional details in memory lead to a lower sense of closure. 
Wilson et al. (2005) found that positive mood lasts longer when a pleasant surprise is 
accompanied by ambiguity (i.e., receiving an unexpected gift with an ambiguous message), 
as opposed to no ambiguity. This is consistent with prior work suggesting a lack of closure 
may result in rumination and stronger emotional intensity (Beike 2007; Beike and Wirth-
Beaumont 2005; Li et al. 2010). Because of this tendency it is also likely that a lack of 
closure can take up significant cognitive and emotional resources. 
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Only recently have marketing researchers begun to explore psychological closure 
as it relates to consumption in more ordinary contexts, such as what to order for dessert. A 
large assortment of chocolates is attractive and is likely to excite people, but choosing from 
a menagerie of choices can generate a host of counterfactual thoughts (e.g., “What if I 
chose the white truffle instead?”). Gu et al. (2013) found that inducing high (vs. low) 
closure after such a choice heightened people’s choice satisfaction as they focused on 
enjoying the chosen option, rather than on forgone alternatives. Why psychological closure 
reduces counterfactual comparisons remains an open question. One possibility is that 
closure psychologically isolates the closed event or creates a mental barrier, which then 
reduces the accessibility of information related to the closed event. Alternatively, closure 
may change levels of mental representations in a way that makes individual, lower-level 
information less salient (i.e., closure may create a more abstract representation of a closed 
event), which would be consistent with the mechanism demonstrated in this dissertation’s 
second essay. 
In sum, existing research on psychological closure focuses predominantly on its 
emotional consequences while some studies show that psychological closure makes the 
closed event less frequently remembered. 
ANTECEDENTS OF CLOSURE 
From where does psychological closure originate? Sometimes, closure occurs 
naturally with time. When people are asked to recall closed (vs. open) life events, they tend 
to remember things that happened a longer time ago (Beike et al. 2004). As someone carries 
on a busy life filling it with new relationships, places, and memories, it may come one day 
as a surprise that what used to be a painful memory is no longer hurtful. This leads to a 
perception of closure (Beike and Wirth-Beaumont 2005). 
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However, psychological closure can also be facilitated or inhibited through various 
interventions, making the topic particularly relevant to marketers. In fact, many businesses 
already attempt to sell products or services under the promise of providing closure and 
peace of mind (Berns 2011). Some examples include the “marketing” of autopsies, private 
investigations, divorce parties, and relationship obituaries that symbolically announce the 
end of relationships. 
Several prior works have also discovered new ways to induce high or low 
psychological closure. For example, directing individuals’ attention to closed (vs. open) 
aspects of an identical experience (e.g., “I will not be seeing them again anyway” vs. “They 
are going to remember me forever”) has been used successfully in prior studies to increase 
feelings of closure (Beike et al. 2007; Beike and Crone 2008). These manipulations 
resemble the internal thought process people may naturally go through when pursuing 
closure. 
Certain sensations or behaviors can also bring about feelings of closure to 
consumers. For example, Thompson, Russo, and Sinclair (1994) used melodic ending-
tunes to deliver feelings of closure. Recent studies in the embodiment literature show that 
psychological closure can also be achieved through actions associated with closure or 
moving on, such as sealing an envelope, turning a page, or closing a lid (Gu et al. 2013; Li 
et al. 2010). In fact, individuals use similar tactics to achieve closure in their lives; people 
bury or encase meaningful objects, attend funerals, and delete old contacts and messages 
as a symbolic gesture of closure. These behavioral methods can be adapted and used to 
enhance feelings of closure in both on- and offline settings. Closing a web browser, logging 
out from a session, or disposing a product in a particular way, and other symbolic actions 
could also deliver a sense of closure to consumers. 
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In sum, the experience of psychological closure or lack thereof can be externally 
induced, and people also seem to use closure as a self-regulation strategy as they 
spontaneously attempt to move on when needed. Further, various closure induction 
techniques suggest there is a broad range of practical implications for managers who want 
to facilitate or delay the closure experience of their customers. 
OVERVIEW OF ESSAYS 
Despite the increasing managerial relevance of and interest in this topic, we do not 
know enough about the role of closure in consumers’ lives. As reviewed earlier, existing 
research on closure primarily focuses on traumatic or highly aversive life experiences, 
while less than a handful of research examine the role of psychological closure on 
consumers’ mundane, daily lives. However, as noted earlier, psychological closure may be 
frequently experienced and sought after in everyday consumption settings that are not 
necessarily negative. Thus, graduation ceremonies, wrap-up sessions at the end of a lecture 
series, and finales of entertainment products are all influential and important moments in 
the overall consumption experience (Clayton 2007; Giantis 2004; Pow 2011). Moreover, 
psychological closure may have other consequences beyond reducing negative emotion 
and rumination. 
Because of this gap in the literature, many questions remain unanswered. How does 
psychological closure on a product or service-related experience affect quality evaluation 
and future performance expectation? How does closure on a consumer learning experience 
affect people’s sense of expertise and memory? To capture the richness of this topic, my 
dissertation aims to answer these questions via exploring the influence of psychological 
closure across a broad range of consumer experiences including both negative and non-
negative ones. More specifically, my first essay demonstrates that closure on a negative 
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consumer experience, such as a product or service failure, makes people feel the experience 
happened further in the past and is less likely to happen again (a heightened sense of 
temporal and probabilistic psychological distance). The second essay shows that closure 
on a consumer learning experience (e.g. reading an educational brochure about a product 
category) facilitates the formation of summary representation of the learning experience 
and consequently, a heightened sense of subjective knowledge. 
To illustrate the value of this research, consider the case where a consumer 
experienced a product or service failure. My first essay will provide guidance to a marketer 
on how facilitating closure on such an experience may help restore brand perception 
through a perceived sense of “pastness” from the mishap, which is also associated with 
more optimistic expectations of the brand’s future performance. In another situation, 
consider a marketer who is creating an educational program to help consumers learn safety 
information about the product. My second essay would help a marketer by suggesting how 
instilling a feeling of closure (or the lack of it) at the end of the program can influence 
consumers’ perceptions of their own degree of knowledge regarding the product category, 
which then can influence consumers’ decision timing and search effort. 
My dissertation as a whole aims to contribute to the existing body of literature by 
exploring cognitive, perceptual, and behavioral implications of psychological closure 
across a wide range of consumer experiences. The dissertation includes two essays that 
each carves out a unique piece of this overall program of research. The following sections 
describe each essay in greater detail, including information about the theory, findings, and 
future research directions.  
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1ST ESSAY – MOVING ON & AWAY: HOW PSYCHOLOGICAL 
CLOSURE INFLUENCES PERCEPTIONS OF DISTANCE 
A new computer with a broken keyboard, a favorite football team that delivers a 
disappointing season, a trusted pair of jeans with embarrassing split seams. These are a few 
examples of many consumer experiences spoiled by negative outcomes. For consumers, 
these experiences may negatively influence attitudes, repurchase intentions, and future 
expectations about the products and services. For marketers this could lead to a decrease 
in brand equity, sales, and negative word of mouth. The present research examines the 
impact of psychological closure on the evolutions of such negative consumer events. 
Specifically, I demonstrate that psychological closure not only helps alleviate negative 
emotion, but also increases psychological distance. Thus, psychologically closed events 
seem like they happened a longer time ago, at a more distant location, and are less likely 
to happen again in the future or to other people. This is also reflected in consumers’ 
perceptions of product quality, repurchase intentions, and willingness to get insurance or 
invest in safety features in case of future negative outcomes. 
As reviewed earlier, psychological closure is a sense that one has completed an 
experience and can effectively move on to something else (Beike et al. 2007). The present 
research explores the notion that closure on negative consumer experiences will increase 
psychological distance, the “subjective experience that something is close or far away from 
the self, here, and now” (Trope and Liberman 2010, 1). Prior research has shown that 
psychological closure can reduce negative emotion associated with significant personal life 
events such as regretted decisions, unsatisfied desires, and traumatic experiences such as 
the death of a child (Li et al. 2010), and that increased emotional intensity in thinking about 
events such as embarrassing experiences, visiting the dentist, or having to perform in public 
can make such events seem closer (Van Boven et al. 2010). I build on these findings and 
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examine the link between closure and psychological distance, in the context of negative 
consumer experiences. 
Among the many psychological distance dimensions, including subjective distance 
in time, space, probability, and social relationships (Trope and Liberman 2010), the present 
research focuses on the role of closure on the first three dimensions. For instance, as a 
result of closure, a negative consumer event such as a product failure may feel more 
psychologically removed from the present, leading it to seem older (Trope and Liberman 
2000), physically further away (spatial distance; Henderson 2011), and less likely or 
common (i.e., probabilistic distance; Todorov, Goren, and Trope 2007; Wakslak et al. 
2006). To illustrate, imagine a consumer with a broken laptop. If she is able to 
psychologically move on from her frustrating experience, she will not only feel that the 
event is behind her, but may also be less likely to abandon the brand in future purchases 
because she sees the product failure as an isolated event with a low chance of reoccurrence. 
Exploring psychological closure as a determinant of consumer perceptions of 
temporal distance is important because prior work has shown that these perceptions can 
influence variables related to attention, evaluation, and choice. For example, increased 
perceptions of temporal distance have been shown to influence preferences for value-laden 
(vs. neutral) messages, to direct attention to central (vs. peripheral) features of products, 
and to increase concern for desirability (vs. feasibility) during choice (Fujita et al. 2008; 
Liberman and Trope 1998; Trope and Liberman 2000). Additionally, increased temporal 
perceptions may also increase impatience for, or discounting of, future rewards because 
they seem further away (Kim and Zauberman 2013). Through similar mechanisms, spatial 
distance has been shown to enhance creative problem solving abilities (Jia, Hirt, and 
Karpen 2009) and negotiation outcomes (Henderson 2011). 
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Exploring psychological closure as it relates to probabilistic distance is also 
important. Greater probabilistic distance means that a given event seems less likely to exist 
or occur (Todorov et al. 2007). If closure reduces probabilistic distance related to negative 
consumer experiences, then negative effects of isolated product and service failures can be 
mitigated as consumers expect similar events are less likely to happen again or to other 
consumers. In other words, the problem will seem less prevalent or pervasive. Importantly, 
a variety of consumer evaluation dimensions and behaviors would reflect such probabilistic 
perceptions, including quality inferences, repurchase intentions, word of mouth, as well as 
decisions to purchase insurance or use protective equipment. 
The present research demonstrates that induced psychological closure can mitigate 
negative consumer experiences by making these problems seem further distant in time and 
space, and unlikely to reoccur. In the following sections, I review the literature on closure 
and psychological distance and introduce hypotheses about the mediating mechanism of 
emotional intensity that accounts for how closure increases psychological distance. 
THE ROLE OF CLOSURE IN PSYCHOLOGICAL DISTANCE 
The perception of distance, whether it is in the dimension of time, space, social 
relationships, or likelihood of events, is highly subjective. For instance, the same event in 
the future or a given location can feel nearer or further away. A same target person can 
seem more or less similar or close. And the existence or occurrence of events can seem 
more or less likely (for an extensive review, see Trope and Liberman 2010). While there 
are many dimensions of psychological distance, empirical findings suggest they are related 
under the general experience of feeling removed from immediate experience (Bar-Anan et 
al. 2007; Matthews and Matlock 2011; Stephan, Liberman, and Trope 2010). Germaine to 
the present research, Van Boven et al. (2010) show that intensified emotion reduces 
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psychological distance; e.g., events described emotionally (vs. objectively) feel like they 
“just happened yesterday” (vs. a long time ago). 
Building on these findings, I suggest that closure has an impact on psychological 
distance at a general level. I propose that a heightened sense of closure on a negative 
consumer event will increase psychological distance, making that event seem further away 
in judgments of time, space, and probability. So, for example, I expect if a favorite sports 
team has a losing season, or if a computer malfunctions, or if an embarrassing situation 
occurs, then people with closure on these events will feel more distant from these 
experiences temporally and physically, and will judge them as less likely to happen again. 
This should also impact consumers’ attitudes towards and repurchase intentions of 
associated products and brands, as well as insurance and other safety-related decisions. 
Based on prior research demonstrating that heightened emotional intensity can make events 
feel closer (Van Boven et al. 2010) and that closure can reduce regret, sad feelings, and 
frustration (Beike et al. 2007; Li et al. 2010), I propose emotional intensity is the key 
mechanism that allows psychological closure to alter people’s perception about time, 
space, and probability, or more generally, psychological distance. Specifically, I 
hypothesize that decreases in emotional intensity mediate the effect of closure on 
psychological distance, and that this effect significantly dampens when emotional recall is 
proscribed. 
PREDICTIONS AND STUDIES OVERVIEW 
I systematically test my hypotheses using multiple closure manipulations adapted 
from prior literature, and through both measurement and manipulation of emotions. Across 
these studies I also explore a number of different types of consumer product and service 
failures, using both actual participant experiences and manipulated presentation of product 
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failures. In addition I examine multiple consumer-related negative emotions including 
disappointment, frustration, anger, and embarrassment. Study 1 demonstrates having 
closure on a disappointing football season leads to greater temporal distance, mediated by 
reduced emotional intensity. Study 2 replicates the mediation result of study 1 in the 
context of a product failure’s influence on probabilistic distance. Studies 3-5 examine the 
moderating role of emotional intensity. Since I predict that closure increases psychological 
distance through reducing emotional intensity, the effect of closure should be more 
prominent when the recalled consumer event is emotional (vs. non-emotional). In study 3, 
I apply an embodiment paradigm to provide people with a sense of closure (by enclosing a 
service complaint letter in a sealed envelope) while using people’s natural emotional 
reaction before closure induction as a moderator. Studies 4 and 5 both manipulate emotion 
prior to closure and measure emotion after closure to further examine the key mechanism. 
Moderated mediation results show that closure increases temporal (study 4) and 
probabilistic (study 5) distance judgments by reducing emotional intensity when events are 
recalled emotionally (vs. objectively) prior to closure manipulation. Study 6 extends the 
findings to physical distance and probabilistic distance related to safety concerns. Study 7 
demonstrates the role of product disposal in the experience of psychological closure and 
restoring positive future expectations, while also highlighting some natural boundary 
conditions associated with product usage. 
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Chapter 1: Study 1 
The purpose of Study 1 was to test whether psychological closure of an unpleasant 
consumer event leads to greater perceived temporal distance from the event. I also sought 
to demonstrate that this relationship is explained by reduced emotional intensity when 
contemplating the event. Therefore, in this study I manipulated closure and measured 
psychological distance as well as emotional intensity. In later studies, I apply 
manipulations to both closure and emotional intensity. 
Study 1 takes advantage of the culmination of an extremely poor season of a top 
ranked college football team and the frustration felt by its college fans. Consumer 
evaluations of such team performance is important to marketers because revenues from the 
top 15 college football teams totaled more than a billion dollars in 2012, and studies show 
that schools’ with winning teams further benefit from increased alumni donations 
(Donahoe 2012; Tucker 2004). The study took place early in the semester following the 
abnormally poor football season. Depending on condition, participants’ sense of closure 
on the football season was either increased or decreased, after which measures of emotion 
and perceived temporal distance were taken. 
METHOD 
Participants and design 
Sixty-five undergraduate students (36 females) from a large American public 
university participated in this study in exchange for extra course credit. They were 
randomly assigned to either a high closure or low closure condition. 
Procedure 
Participants used a computer in a lab setting and completed the study at their own 
pace, isolated from other participants. All participants were reminded of how poorly their 
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football team performed in the prior season by first reading a real single-page news article 
about the team’s loss to a long standing rival, and then watching a short video clip of two 
sports analysts criticizing the team. Next, participants were randomly assigned to either the 
high or low closure manipulation. Following Beike et al. (2007), closure was manipulated 
in this study by having participants write about the event. Specifically they were told: 
 
Sometimes people say that they have [do not have] “closure” on an experience; that 
the experience is like a “CLOSED CHAPTER [UNFINISHED BUSINESS]” to 
them. They say this when the experience feels [doesn’t feel] complete, and they 
feel ready to move on from it. Please describe why the last year's football season 
could be considered "CLOSED [NOT CLOSED]" to you. 
 
Following the closure manipulation, participants provided ratings of self-reported 
closure, also adapted from previous literature (Beike et al. 2007). Participants used 7-point 
scales to indicate agreement with the statements, “I have closure on the last year's college 
football season,” “I can put the last year's college football season behind me,” “The last 
year's college football season feels like a 'closed book' to me,” and “The last year's college 
football season feels like 'unfinished business' to me” (1 = not at all, 7 = very much). 
Participants’ emotional intensity when thinking about the prior year’s football season was 
measured by having them use 11-point scales to indicate the extent of feeling frustrated, 
upset, angry, anxious, and unsettled (1 = not at all, 11 = very much). 
Finally, participants provided measures of temporal distance from the prior football 
season. The questions were adopted from prior research on psychological distance (Van 
Boven et al. 2010); participants used two 11-point scales anchored from 1 = “feels like 
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yesterday” to 11 = “feels far away” and  from 1 = “feels very close” to 11 = “feels very 
distant.” 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Manipulation check 
The four perceived closure items were averaged to create a single measure of 
psychological closure (α = .92). As expected, participants reported a greater sense of 
closure in the high (M = 3.77) versus low closure condition (M = 2.32; t(63) = 3.86, p < 
.001). 
Negative emotion 
Factor Analysis revealed that participants’ responses to the five negative emotional 
states loaded together as a single factor (α = .94), so they were averaged and used as a 
single measure of negative emotional intensity. As predicted, participants in the high 
closure condition reported significantly less negative emotion (M = 4.00) compared to 
those in the low closure condition (M = 5.59; t(63) = 2.53, p = .01). 
Temporal distance and mediation analysis 
The two temporal distance scales were averaged to form a single temporal distance 
measure (α = .88). Consistent with my prediction, participants in the high closure condition 
reported a greater sense of temporal distance (M = 7.14) than in the low closure condition 
(M = 5.48; t(63) = 2.97, p < .01). 
Using the bootstrapping method (Preacher and Hayes 2008), I tested whether the 
effect of the closure manipulation on perceived temporal distance was mediated by changes 
in negative emotion. Consistent with my prediction, the indirect effect of closure on 
temporal distance through emotion was positive and significant with a confidence interval 
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excluding zero (n boots = 5,000, 95% BCa CI[.05, .66]; figure 1.1). The direct effect of 
closure on the temporal distance (c’ path), after the path through emotion was accounted 
for, was marginally significant (b = .56, t = 2.05, p = .05). 
Discussion 
Study 1 shows that closure on a negative event indeed leads to greater temporal 
distance and that this relationship is mediated by changes in the intensity of negative 
emotion when thinking about the event. This finding supports my thesis which is that 
closure increases psychological distance by reducing emotional reactions to the closed 
event. To extend my finding to other psychological distance dimensions, the following 
study aims to replicate this pattern in a product failure context and examines the effect of 
closure on probabilistic distance, mediated by emotional intensity. 
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Chapter 2: Study 2 
An important dimension of psychological distance is that related to perceived 
probability or hypotheticality of events (Todorov et al. 2007). Estimates of probability may 
be particularly important for consumers following a product failure because these estimates 
may influence consumers’ likelihood of repurchasing the same brand or their intent to 
purchase insurance or maintenance contracts to cover similar negative events. Thus, in this 
study, I examined a product failure scenario – a computer with a malfunctioning keyboard. 
As in study 1, I manipulated closure on the experience and measured emotional intensity, 
but in this study I measured perceptions of probabilistic distance as it relates to the 
likelihood of reoccurrence of the problem. 
METHOD 
Participants and design 
Seventy-six undergraduate students (50 females) from a large university and thirty-
seven Amazon Mechanical Turk respondents (27 females) participated in this study in 
exchange for extra course credit or a small monetary reward. For Amazon Mechanical Turk 
participants, I selected users who were located in the U.S. and had a 95% prior HIT 
acceptance rate. I applied the same selective criteria to other studies using Amazon 
participants in the present research. None of the effects were qualified by data source nor 
did adding data source as a covariate alter my results; hence datasets from two sources 
were consolidated. Participants were randomly assigned to either a high or low closure 
condition. 
Procedure 
All participants first read a negative product review that was allegedly written by 
an actual consumer who participated in a previous research. The review was written to 
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provide an emotionally charged description of a frustrating experience with a computer 
keyboard and was based on actual consumer reviews of a computer found on Amazon.com. 
Below is an excerpt of the review read by the participants: 
 
“I bought this laptop online on Amazon.com because it was a well-known brand 
(ranked one of the top 5 in laptops) and had good ratings... The laptop worked very 
well for about 8 months and then I started having some serious issues with the 
keyboard. The letters g, h, b, n will occasionally delete an entire sentence if I hit 
them. I didn't understand why… It was EXTREMELY frustrating. I use this laptop 
for work and it was the only computer I owned… Out of nowhere, my keyboard 
would start acting out like this, making it impossible for me to work on anything. I 
had some important due dates that I almost missed because of this issue. I was 
furious!” 
 
After reading the product review, participants were assigned to either the high 
closure or low closure manipulation (same as study 1) with participants asked to write why 
the consumer who wrote the review might consider the product experience as closed or not 
closed. The four manipulation check questions were also adapted from study 1 to fit the 
product-failure context and were anchored on a scale from -5 (not at all) to 5 (very much). 
Following the manipulation check, participants provided their own emotional reactions to 
the consumer’s experience. Specifically they were asked, “How does thinking about this 
consumer's experience make YOU feel right now?” to which they indicated how angry, 
upset, frustrated, irritated, and annoyed they felt (1 = not at all, 11 = extremely). 
Finally, I measured participants’ probabilistic distance perceptions. These 
questions included the perceived likelihood that the same keyboard problem would 
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reoccur, the overall quality of product and brand, and purchase intention. Given the fact 
that participants read an identical product review, quality evaluation and purchase intention 
should reflect the perceived prevalence of the keyboard problem. Specifically, they were 
asked “How likely do you think this consumer's laptop keyboard problem will reoccur?” 
(reverse-coded), “What do you think of the brand of this laptop in terms of overall product 
quality?”, “When thinking about future laptop purchases, do you think this consumer 
should consider buying from this brand again?”, and “If you knew the brand of this laptop, 
would you consider buying one of their laptops in the future?” (1 = not at all, 7 = very 
much). Higher scores indicated lower perceived likelihood of the keyboard problem being 
prevalent, meaning greater probabilistic distance. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Manipulation check 
The four psychological closure items were averaged to form a single measure of 
self-reported closure (α = .81). Confirming the manipulation, participants in the high 
closure condition reported a greater sense of closure (M = .77), compared to those in the 
low closure condition (M = -1.06; t(111) = 5.07, p < .001). 
Negative emotion 
The five negative emotion questions (angry, upset, frustrated, irritated, annoyed) 
loaded together as a single factor and were averaged to create a single measure of negative 
emotion (α = .94). As predicted, participants in the high closure condition reported 
significantly lower negative emotion (M = 4.54) compared to those in the low closure 
condition (M = 5.95; t(111) = 2.97, p < .01). 
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Probabilistic distance 
As expected, a single factor emerged from the four probabilistic distance questions; 
therefore, I averaged across these questions to create a single measure (α = .70). As 
predicted, participants in the high (vs. low) closure condition exhibited greater probabilistic 
distance (M = 3.79 vs. M = 3.34; t(111) = 2.23, p < .05). That is, participants in the closed 
(vs. not closed) condition perceived the probability of the same laptop keyboard problem 
happening again as lower, which was also reflected in their relatively more positive 
evaluation towards the product and brand. 
Mediation analysis 
To test whether the effect of closure on probabilistic distance is mediated by 
changes in negative emotion, I conducted a mediation analysis (Preacher and Hayes 2008). 
As predicted, the bootstrapping test (n boots = 5,000) showed the indirect effect of closure 
on probabilistic distance through emotion is positive and significant with a 95% BCa 
confidence interval excluding zero (.003, .162; figure 1.2). The direct effect of the closure 
on the dependent variable (c’ path) was not significant (b = .17, t = 1.65 p = .10). 
Discussion 
Study 2 extends my findings by showing the robustness of the relationship between 
closure and psychological distance. In study 1 I observed that closure on a negative 
consumer event influences perceptions of temporal distance mediated though emotion. 
Here, closure on a negative product experience influences perceptions of probabilistic 
distance also mediated through emotion. When people were instructed to consider a 
product failure as closed (vs. open), their negative emotional reaction became less intense, 
and they reported that the problem is less prevalent and less likely to happen again. 
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A further test of the role of emotion in the relationship between closure and 
psychological distance would involve examining moderation by emotional intensity. If 
closure affects psychological distance by reducing emotion, the effect of closure should be 
stronger when the event is recalled with (vs. without) emotion prior to the closure 




Chapter 3: Study 3 
The purpose of study 3 was threefold. In studies 1 and 2, I held the negative event 
constant across participants by relying on a shared outcome (the poor football season in 
study 1) or a common negative outcome experienced by another consumer (the defective 
laptop in study 2). A drawback of these studies is that, in study 1, I could not be certain 
that all participants evaluated the football season as a negative event, and in study 2, the 
negative event was described, but not actually experienced by the participant. Therefore in 
study 3, I relax the control of the specific negative event, and elicit events from 
participants’ own experiences as consumers that they deem negative. 
The second purpose was to examine closure using a behavioral manipulation. To 
manipulate closure in studies 1 and 2, I used a reason-listing task that is accepted and 
commonly used in the existing literature (Beike et al. 2007; Beike and Crone 2008). While 
there is nothing in the instructions of this manipulation that asks for consideration of one’s 
emotions, or temporal and probabilistic judgments, I wish to rule out the possibility that, 
for the observed results to hold, this specific closure manipulation is required. So in study 
3, closure is manipulated by embodied cognition. Prior work has shown that bodily 
experiences that are connected to the psychological experience of closure (e.g., enclosing 
a tragic story in an envelope and sealing it, turning the page, closing the lid) can effectively 
provide closure. In this study, participants write about a personally experienced service 
failure after which they either do or do not seal what they have written in an envelope (Li 
et al. 2010). This paradigm is useful in this context of service failure as it resembles real 
life situations that participants may encounter as consumers. Hence, for generalizability, 
this task was designed to be similar to a consumer writing and sending a letter of complaint 
to a service provider. 
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Another important purpose of this study was to examine people’s natural emotional 
experiences related to an actual service failure as a moderator. I predicted the effect of 
closure on psychological distance would be positively related to the extent of emotionality 
of the recalled service failure. 
METHOD 
Participants and design 
Sixty-seven undergraduate students (42 females) of a large American public 
university participated in this study in exchange for extra course credit. They were 
randomly assigned to a high or low closure condition. 
Procedure 
All participants were asked to identify and answer some basic questions about an 
instance in which they recently had a negative service experience. Next, they were given a 
paper survey, resembling a customer service complaint survey. They were told “first 
describe the service experience you had” and then “with vivid details, describe how you 
felt.” After completing the service complaint survey, they were randomly assigned to either 
a high or low closure condition. In the high closure condition, participants were instructed 
to put their service complaint survey in an envelope, seal the flap with a sticker, and to 
submit the writing to the experimenter. In the low closure condition, participants did not 
put their writing in an envelope and simply submitted the paper to the experimenter. 
Participants were then asked questions on probabilistic distance. Specifically, 
participants were asked “If you were to receive the service (you wrote about [insert service 
category]) from the same store/company again, how likely do you think a similar problem 
will reoccur?” (1 = highly unlikely, 7 = highly likely) and “How common or uncommon 
do you think your bad service experience was?” (1 = highly uncommon / isolated incident, 
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7 = highly common / widely experienced). For the latter question, additional information 
was given on what a common or uncommon experience meant. Participants were told 
“Common experience means that the problem was profuse and was widely experienced by 
other people; uncommon experience means that it was an isolated incident, and you just 
got unlucky.” This was to capture, as in study 2, the pervasiveness of the service failure 
problem. 
To measure the emotional intensity of the service failures, three independent coders 
unaware of the research hypotheses and of the participants’ closure manipulation 
conditions were employed. Specifically, the coders were asked to read each participant’s 
entire complaint and provide a holistic evaluation of the overall emotion expressed in it 
using a 7-point scale (1 = not at all emotional; 7 = very emotional). The inter-coder 
reliability was sufficiently high (α = .71); hence, I averaged the three coders’ responses to 
form a single measure of complaint emotionality. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Probabilistic distance 
The two probabilistic distance items were averaged to create a single measure (α = 
.76). Psychological closure increased probabilistic distance as indicated by the lower 
perceived likelihood of the service failure reoccurring (b = -.36, t = -1.84, p < .10), but 
more importantly, this effect was qualified by the predicted interaction between recall 
emotionality and closure manipulation (b = -.45, t = -2.30, p < .05; figure 1.3). Further 
examination using the spotlight analysis method (Irwin and McClelland 2001) revealed 
that, for those who described the service failure with strong emotional intensity (spotlighted 
at 1 SD above the mean), psychological closure increased probabilistic distance, meaning 
it decreased probabilistic estimates (b = -0.81, t = -2.92, p < .01). When the failure was 
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described with lower emotional intensity (spotlighted at 1 SD below the mean), closure 
had no impact on probabilistic judgments (b = .09, t = .32, p > .50). 
Discussion 
Study 3 was different from studies 1 and 2 in several important ways. Consistent 
with previous research using physical actions to induce closure (Gu et al. 2013; Li et al. 
2010) I provided further evidence that a sense of closure can be obtained not only through 
internal thought processes or cognitive reappraisals (e.g., the reason-listing activity) but 
also through behaviors that embody the closure construct. Specifically, this study 
mimicked a consumer complaint context, providing support for practical implications. My 
finding suggests that consumers may end up with a very different perception about the 
likely reoccurrence and prevalence of a problem as a result of simply providing an envelope 
with a seal when collecting service evaluations. 
More importantly, unlike studies 1 and 2 that provided a single negative consumer 
experience for all participants, those participating in this study wrote about their own 
unique negative experience before they were induced to feel a high or low sense of closure. 
This allows me to observe natural variation in participants’ emotional intensity associated 
with negative events. As predicted, participants who spontaneously recalled more 
emotional experiences were the ones who benefitted most from closure; the act of writing 
a negative experience and sealing it in an envelope significantly decreased negative 
emotion and increased probabilistic distance judgments. Participants who wrote about 
events low in negative emotional intensity, on the contrary, were not affected by the act of 
closure. This is consistent with my hypothesis that closure increases psychological distance 
through reduction of emotional intensity; when emotional intensity is lacking in the first 
place, closure has less of an effect. 
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While using natural emotional variation as a moderator of closure benefits from 
high external validity, it is possible that more emotional service failures are inherently 
different from less emotional ones. To address this possibility and strengthen internal 
validity of theory-testing, studies 4 and 5 aim to replicate the result of study 3 while directly 
manipulating levels of emotionality prior to manipulating closure. 
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Chapter 4: Study 4 
Study 4 was designed with two purposes in mind. The first was to further explore 
the role of emotion in the relationship between closure and psychological distance by 
introducing a manipulation of emotional intensity in recalling a negative event. Based on 
my argument that emotion is a mediator of closure on psychological distance, I expect 
closure to increase the sense of distance from a negative event to a greater extent when the 
event is initially recalled in an emotional (vs. emotionless) manner. This should result in a 
moderated mediation. In other words, measures of emotion will mediate the relationship 
between closure and distance when a negative event is recalled in an emotional manner. 
This will not be observed in the emotionless recall condition as there will be little negative 
emotion to alleviate. 
Second, toward understanding the robustness of the effect of closure on 
psychological distance from negative events, in this study, I explore personally 
embarrassing experiences as negative outcomes. Prior researchers exploring feelings of 
embarrassment in consumer settings have suggested that felt embarrassment may delay 
purchases, reduce purchase quantity, and lead consumers to employ strategies to avoid 
others (Dahl, Gorn, and Weinberg 1998; Dahl, Manchanda, and Argo 2001). Additionally, 
this domain is relevant for comparison to other recent work on the direct relationship 
between emotional intensity and psychological distance that has also examined 
embarrassment (Van Boven et al. 2010).  
METHOD 
Participants and design 
One hundred and ninety-three people participated in this study. Among them, 92 
people (40 females) were undergraduate students at a large university who participated in 
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exchange for extra course credit. The remaining 101 people (63 females) were from 
Amazon Mechanical Turk, who completed the surveys online in exchange for a small 
monetary reward. Data from both sources was collected during the same one month period. 
None of my analyses were qualified by respondent source; hence the datasets from the two 
sources were consolidated. The experiment was a 2 (description emotionality: high vs. low) 
x 2 (closure: high vs. low) between-participants design. 
Procedure 
All participants completed the study on a computer and progressed at their own 
pace. Participants were first instructed to recall one specific embarrassing moment that they 
had experienced recently within the past two years. To ensure participants came up with a 
specific incident, they were first asked to provide some basic information about the event 
including when and where it happened. 
Next, on a new page, they were asked to describe their event either emotionally or 
non-emotionally. The emotionality manipulation was adapted from Van Boven et al. 
(2010). In the high emotionality condition participants were told “describe the 
embarrassing moment you had in an EMOTIONAL way. Write about it as though you are 
actually re-experiencing what happened to you. Please write about it in such a way that 
someone would feel embarrassed just by reading your description. Also write about how 
other people around you may have thought negative things about you at the moment.” In 
the low emotionality condition participants were told to “describe the embarrassing 
moment you had in an OBJECTIVE way. Avoid using emotional words in your writings 
and simply list facts about the event. Write about the experience from a detached 
perspective.” 
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Next, participants completed either the high or low closure manipulation task used 
in studies 1 and 2. To check whether the closure manipulation was successful, participants 
used Likert-type scales anchored from -10 to +10 to show agreement with the statements 
related to closure on the negative event. 
Emotionality was measured by having participants use 11-point scales anchored 
with “Not at all” to “Extremely” to rate feelings of being embarrassed, unsettled, anxious, 
and nervous when thinking about the embarrassing moment. Finally, temporal distance was 
measured with the same two items used in study 1, adapted from Van Boven et al. (2010). 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Manipulation check 
All four questions measuring participants’ feeling of closure on their embarrassing 
moments loaded together as a single factor (α = .90). The psychological closure 
manipulation was successful. The average self-reported closure was higher in the high (M 
= 6.88) versus low closure condition (M = 2.95; t(191) = 5.63, p < .001). 
Embarrassment 
All four emotion measures loaded together as a single factor; hence, the items were 
averaged to form a single index of experienced embarrassment (α = .90). An ANOVA with 
embarrassment as the dependent variable revealed main effects of description emotionality 
and closure manipulation, as well as a significant interaction between the two. Describing 
the story emotionally (vs. objectively) led to stronger feelings of embarrassment (M = 3.98 
vs. M = 3.22; F(1, 189) = 4.36, p < .05). The same happened when participants wrote about 
the event as open versus closed (M = 4.11 vs. M = 3.08; F(1, 189) = 7.93, p < .01). 
Importantly, further examination of the two-way interaction supported my theory (F(1, 
189) = 5.63, p < .05). Manipulating high psychological closure (vs. lack of closure) 
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significantly decreased reported embarrassment intensity in the emotional description 
condition (M = 3.04 vs. M = 4.82, F(1, 189) = 14.61, p < .001), but not in the non-emotional 
description condition (M = 3.13 vs. M = 3.29; F(1, 189) = .09, NS). 
Actual and subjective temporal distance 
Across all conditions, the average amount of time since the participants’ 
embarrassing experience was 11 months (SD = 18.7). This did not differ by condition (ps 
> .1) nor did it alter the results when controlled for. That is, participants reported events 
that were similarly distant in time. 
To measure subjective temporal distance, I averaged the two questions on perceived 
temporal distance (α = .91). An ANOVA was performed with psychological closure and 
manipulated emotionality as between-participants factors predicting temporal distance. 
This revealed the predicted interaction between description emotionality and psychological 
closure (F(1, 189) = 5.06; p < .05; figure 1.4a). When the embarrassing event was described 
emotionally, having psychological closure (vs. lacking closure) increased perceived 
temporal distance (M = 6.84 vs. M = 5.24; F(1, 189) = 9.35, p < .01). There was no effect 
of closure when the event was described with low emotion (M = 6.44 vs. M = 6.57; F(1, 
189) = .06, NS). 
Moderated mediation 
To test whether or not there is a conditional mediating effect of emotional intensity, 
I performed a moderated mediation analysis using the bootstrapping method with measured 
emotional intensity as the mediator (Preacher and Hayes 2008). The interacting effect of 
closure and description conditions on perceived temporal distance with a 95% confidence 
interval excluding zero (n boots = 5,000, BCa CI [.021, .183]; figure 1.4b) indicates 
statistical significance of the moderated mediation result. I probed further to examine the 
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direction of the effect. As predicted, embarrassment intensity significantly mediated the 
effect of closure on temporal distance under high description emotionality (n boots = 5,000, 
95% BCa CI [.192, .688]), but not under low description emotionality (n boots = 5,000, 
95% BCa CI [-.185, .282]). The direct effect (c’ path) of closure x description emotionality 
on temporal distance was not significant (b = .12, t = 1.38, p > .1). 
Discussion 
Study 4 goes beyond the results of prior studies to explore the mechanism 
underlying the effect of closure on psychological distance. Not only do the findings 
replicate the mediation by emotional intensity as shown in studies 1 and 2, but they also 
demonstrate that, for low emotion events, closure has a weaker impact on temporal 
distance. This moderation replicates the findings of study 3 except with manipulated (vs. 
spontaneously selected) event emotionality prior to closure. The next study replicates the 
same moderated mediation pattern but does so by examining perceptions of probabilistic 
distance in a context involving a personal product failure experience. 
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Chapter 5: Study 5 
Study 5 aims to replicate the findings of the previous study with probabilistic 
distance as the key dependent variable. Like the moderated mediation result of study 4, I 
expected that psychological closure should increase probabilistic distance when a negative 
event is recalled emotionally, and within the emotional description condition, change in 
emotional intensity should mediate the effect of closure. 
In this study, I used participants’ actual product failure experiences as the negative 
consumer event. Unlike studies 2 and 3 that asked how likely participants think a problem 
would reoccur, this study captured probabilistic perception in a more practical manner 
using a measure directly relevant to a product failure context – by asking about intention 
to purchase a warranty to cover the potential problem in the future. 
METHOD 
Participants and design 
One hundred and one students (54 females) from a large university participated in 
the study in exchange for extra course credit. As in study 4, the experiment was a 2 
(description emotionality: high vs. low) x 2 (closure: high vs. low) between-participants 
design. 
Procedure 
Participants were first asked to recall a frustrating product failure that they had 
experienced with an electronics product within the past 2 years. After answering some 
basic questions about the failed product (e.g., what the product category was), participants 
continued to the next page where they were asked to describe the frustrating product 
experience in either an emotional or an emotionless manner, depending on condition, as in 
study 4. Next participants completed the closure manipulation reason-listing task inducing 
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either high or low closure and responded to the four closure manipulation check questions 
anchored from -10 (strongly disagree) to 10 (strongly agree) as in the prior studies. Emotion 
was measured by having participants use an 11-point scale (1 = not at all, 11 = extremely) 
to indicate how frustrated, angry, annoyed, upset, and uneasy they felt when thinking about 
the product experience they wrote about. 
Probabilistic distance from the product failure experience (how prevalent the 
problem is and how likely the same failure would happen again) was captured in this study 
by asking participants’ inclination to purchase insurance or warranty for the same problem 
in the future. Specifically, participants were asked “If you were to buy a(n) [the reported 
product] from this brand again, would you consider getting insurance/warranty that covers 
the same kind of problem you experienced?” (1 = not at all, 7 = very much). Lower 
intention to purchase a warranty indicates greater psychological distance. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Manipulation check 
The four questions measuring psychological closure were averaged to form a single 
measure of closure (α = .92). The closure manipulation was successful; participants in the 
high closure condition reported a greater sense of closure (M = 3.48) than those in the low 
closure condition (M = -.12; F(1, 92) = 8.95, p < .01). 
Negative emotion 
A single factor emerged from the five emotion items. An average of these items 
was used as a measure of negative emotional reaction to the recalled event (α = .92). As 
predicted and consistent with the findings of study 4, a significant two-way interaction 
between description emotionality and closure emerged (F(1, 97) = 4.56; p < .05). Further 
comparisons revealed that high (vs. low) closure manipulation significantly reduced 
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participants’ negative emotion in the emotional description condition (M = 4.13 vs. M = 
5.78; F(1, 97) = 5.51, p < .05) but not in the objective description condition (M = 5.03 vs. 
M = 4.62; F(1, 97) = .39, NS). 
Probabilistic distance 
Probabilistic distance was captured through participant’s warranty purchase 
intention; lower intention to purchase a warranty indicates greater probabilistic distance. 
An ANOVA on the two manipulated factors and their interactions yielded a marginal main 
effect of closure and a two-way interaction between description emotionality and closure. 
Participants in the high closure condition were somewhat less inclined to purchase 
warranty (M = 4.35) than those in the low closure condition (M = 5.06; F(1, 97) = 3.65, p 
< .1); but importantly, this effect was qualified by description emotionality (F(1, 97) = 
4.91; p < .05; figure 1.5a). As predicted, only when the product failure was described 
emotionally, those in the high closure condition were less likely to purchase a warranty to 
protect against a similar product failure (M = 3.78) compared to those in the low closure 
condition (M = 5.38; F(1, 97) = 8.06, p < .01). However, when the product failure was 
described with low emotion, there was no significant difference between the high versus 
low closure conditions (M = 4.93 vs. M = 4.81; F(1, 97) = .05, NS). 
Moderated mediation 
As in study 4, a moderated mediation analysis was performed using the 
bootstrapping method (Preacher and Hayes 2008). As predicted, the mediation testing the 
relationship between closure, negative emotion, and psychological distance was moderated 
by description emotionality manipulation (figure 1.5b). The interacting effect of closure 
and description conditions on perceived probabilistic distance (lower intention to purchase 
warranty indicate greater probabilistic distance perception) with a 95% confidence interval 
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excluding zero (n boots = 5,000, BCa CI [.002, .276]; figure 4b) indicates statistical 
significance. When probed at the level of emotional description condition, reduced 
negative emotion mediated the effect of closure on probabilistic distance (n boots = 5,000, 
95% BCa CI [.008, .430]). The mediation was unsuccessful when probed at the objective 
description condition (n boots = 5,000, 95% BCa CI [-.210, .058]). 
Discussion 
Study 5 replicated the moderated mediation effect of study 4 in a probabilistic 
distance domain. Closure increased probabilistic distance (i.e., reduced people’s intention 
to purchase a warranty for the same product failure in the future) only when a negative 
event was described emotionally (vs. without emotion) prior to the closure manipulation. 
Within the emotional description condition, reduced emotional intensity mediated the 
negative effect of closure on warranty purchase intention. The finding further supports my 
theory that closure increases psychological distance by reducing the intensity of emotional 
reaction to the closed event. 
Thus far, across a range of negative consumer events, I have shown that 
psychological closure increases perceptions of both temporal and probabilistic distance. I 
have also demonstrated the role of emotionality in this effect by both measuring changes 
in emotion and manipulating emotionality prior to closure. Still psychological distance can 
be expressed beyond time and probability. In the next study, I demonstrate further 
robustness of the influence of closure on psychological distance by including measures of 
perceived physical distance from a negative event. 
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Chapter 6: Study 6 
The purpose of this study was to extend the scope of my findings beyond temporal 
and probabilistic distance to show the role of closure on negative consumer events in 
estimates of physical (or spatial) distance. I predicted a heightened sense of closure on a 
given event would increase the perceived spatial distance from the event. In other words, 
it would be perceived that the event happened in a more distant location. In terms of 
probabilistic distance, this study explores the effect of closure in a context where lowered 
perception of risk has important safety implications. 
METHOD 
Participants and design 
One hundred and ninety undergraduate students (105 females) from a large 
university participated in the study in exchange for extra course credit. 
Procedure 
Participants first read an actual news story about a tragic accident. The story 
described how a 10-month old baby girl drowned when she fell from a pier as her mother 
fainted. To ensure participants’ psychological distance judgments were not influenced by 
factors other than my experimental treatments, all mentions of locations were removed 
from the article and I told participants that all names were disguised to protect the victims’ 
privacy. 
After reading the news story, participants were randomly assigned to either a high 
or low closure condition. The reason-listing task and the manipulation check questions 
measuring self-reported experience of closure were identical to those used in previous 
studies. The manipulation check items were anchored from -10 (strongly disagree) to 10 
(strongly agree). After the closure manipulation, participants indicated the extent to which 
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the news story made them feel sad, upset, anxious, distressed, unsettled, disrupted, 
shocked, and angry on 11-point Likert-type scales (1 = not at all, 11 = very much). 
Perceived physical distance and probabilistic distance were each measured on 100-
point sliding scales. For physical distance, the instruction read “Consider how near of far 
from here you feel the events in the news story took place,” with the sliding scale anchored 
from 0 (“near to where I am now”) to 100 (“far from where I am now”). 
Similar to study 5, probabilistic distance was measured in a manner of high 
practical relevance. I asked participants the importance of additional safety features on the 
pier where the accident took place. To avoid ceiling effects I said the city already met all 
federal and state safety regulation standards. The sliding scale asked “…how important is 
it that the city builds additional safety features on the pier?” and was anchored from 0 (“not 
important”) to 100 (“very important”). 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Manipulation check 
One participant noted being familiar with the news story prior to participating in 
the experiment, and therefore was excluded from further analyses. Including this 
respondent did not alter the pattern of results. I averaged the four closure items (α = .83) 
and found that the manipulation was successful; participants in the high (vs. low) closure 
condition reported a greater sense of closure than those in the low closure condition (M = 
3.28 vs. M = -.54; F(1, 187) = 37.22, p < .001). 
Negative emotion 
The eight questions on negative emotional reaction towards the news story loaded 
together highly as a single factor; hence, I averaged them into a composite measure of 
negative emotion (α = .92). Consistent with my proposed mechanism, participants in the 
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high psychological closure condition reported feeling less intense negative emotion when 
thinking about the news story (M = 4.23), compared to those in the low closure condition 
(M = 4.88; F(1, 187) = 4.23, p < .05). 
Psychological distance and mediation analyses 
Consistent with my prediction, high (vs. low) psychological closure led people to 
feel that the accident in the news story happened in a more distant location (M = 72.14 vs. 
M = 61.19; F(1, 187) = 8.62, p < .01). In addition, conceptually replicating the results of 
prior studies, participants in the high (vs. low) closure condition indicated that it is less 
important to install additional safety features that could prevent similar accidents from 
happening again (M = 50.23 vs. M = 62.21; F(1, 187) = 6.06, p < .05). 
Importantly, changes in negative emotion as a function of closure mediated the 
above effects. Using the bootstrapping method (Preacher and Hayes 2008), I found that 
negative emotion significantly mediated the effect of closure on physical distance (n boots 
= 5,000; 95% BCa CI [.009, 1.903]) and safety investment (n boots = 5,000; 95% BCa CI 
[-2.994, -.171]). The direct effect of closure on the psychological distance (c’ path) after 
the mediation through emotion was accounted for was also significant for both physical (b 
= 4.83, t = 2.59, p = .01) and probabilistic distance domains (b = -4.75, t = -1.99, p = .05). 
Discussion 
These results demonstrate that psychological closure affects psychological distance 
at a general level, broadening the theoretical and practical implications of the role of 




Chapter 7: Study 7 
The purpose of this study was to examine the role of product disposal in the context 
of closure and psychological distance. People sometimes decide to keep products (instead 
of disposing them) because of emotional attachments or thrifty considerations (Haws et al. 
2012). Products that have special meaning are often disposed strategically and thoughtfully 
to reflect their meaningful nature (Naylor 2006). This prior research suggests that product 
disposal could be a manifestation of psychological closure regarding the product, or a way 
in which people gain a sense of closure. This could explain why people decide to get rid of 
certain products at the end of the year or when they want to have a fresh new start (Jenkins 
2012; O'Dea 2011). Indeed, our pilot study described in the following Methods section 
demonstrates that product disposal is an effective way to manipulate high versus low 
psychological closure. 
But when would product disposal be most effective in restoring damaged product 
evaluations in terms of probabilistic risk judgments? What my theory and prior studies of 
the present research suggest is that disposing products that trigger stronger (vs. weaker) 
negative emotional reactions would be more effective in this regard. This is because closure 
increases psychological distance through dampening the associated emotional intensity. 
Similar to Study 3, this study uses natural variation in people’s emotional intensity 
associated with products to moderate the effect of closure on probabilistic distance. 
Products’ problems will likely provoke stronger negative reactions if they occur 
prematurely, that is, before the consumer feels she got her money’s worth. Okada (2001) 
utilizes the term residual value to explain this idea. As people purchase a product, they 
open a mental account and keep track of their product usage. For example, a consumer who 
acquires a $50 sweater may feel that every time she wears the sweater she gets a utility 
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equivalent to $5. On the tenth wear she breaks even and the mental book value (residual 
value) of the sweater would reach zero. This break-even point is when a consumer feels 
that she has gotten her money’s worth from the product. However, in many cases 
consumers face problems that prevent them from continuing to use the product until they 
break-even, and this state would be associated with high negative affect. 
Another important factor that can be linked to high negative emotion is the 
inconclusiveness of a products’ problem. Some products develop problems that make 
consumers feel certain they will never use the product again (conclusive problems), while 
other products have problems that are ongoing struggles (inconclusive problems). 
Inconclusive (vs. conclusive) problems would make consumers think they may be able to 
continue to use the product. However, such problems are associated with greater 
uncertainty and are likely to be highly salient because of their ongoing nature. For example, 
a printer that works only sometimes will likely cause greater, more prolonged frustration 
than a printer that, without a doubt, stopped working completely. Of course, we predict 
there would be an interaction between the two aforementioned factors because high 
problem inconclusiveness would not prompt strong negative emotion if the consumer has 
already gotten her money’s worth from the product. That is, if a consumer has already 
gotten her money’s worth from a product, any further usage would be perceived as a gain. 
My pretest results showed exactly this pattern. Ninety-six respondents (53 females) 
on Amazon Mechanical Turk completed an online survey in exchange for a small monetary 
reward. Participants simply recalled a product that has a problem preventing them from 
using the product. Then they answered some basic questions, including a question asking 
the extent to which they felt they got their money’s worth from this product (residual 
value), and a question asking the extent to which they thought they would use the product 
again in the future (problem inconclusiveness), both on 7-point scales. Then I asked 
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participants to what degree the product made them feel frustrated, annoyed, upset, and 
angry (α = .92) using 11-point scales. 
I ran a linear regression model with the two key variables (getting money’s worth 
and problem inconclusiveness) and their interaction as independent variables, and the 
average negative emotion as the dependent variable. The analysis showed that participants 
felt stronger negative emotion if they did not get their money’s worth (i.e. high residual 
value remaining in product; b = -.36, SE = .14, p = .01), and if the problem was more 
inconclusive (b = .35, SE = .17, p = .04). More importantly, there was an interaction 
between two factors when predicting negative emotion (b = -.13, SE = .07, p = .07; figure 
6a). Further examination of the interaction using the spotlighting method (Irwin and 
McClelland 2001) revealed that, among participants experiencing high problem 
inconclusiveness (+1 SD), people who did not get their money’s worth experienced 
stronger negative emotion than those who did get their money’s worth (b = -.58, SE = .12, 
p < .01). Moreover, when spotlighted at people who did not get their money’s worth (-1 
SD), greater problem inconclusiveness led to stronger negative emotion (b = .61, SE = .24, 
p = .01). 
In sum, products with inconclusive problems that begun to occur prematurely, 
before participants’ got their money’s worth, were associated with the strongest negative 
emotion. Thus, I predicted that a psychological closure manipulation in the form of product 




Participants and design 
Eighty-seven participants (42 females) using Amazon Mechanical Turk completed 
the survey online for a small monetary reward. The study was a two-cell design that 
compared completing versus not completing a product disposal simulation exercise as a 
way of manipulating high versus low closure, respectively. 
Procedure 
Participants were told they are taking part of a research project on “decluttering and 
recycling.” Then they recalled a product they own but do not feel ready to get rid of, even 
though “the product has a problem that makes you upset when thinking about it and 
prevents you from using it.” Next, participants answered some questions about this product. 
They reported what the product was, what the problem of the product was, and as a control 
variable, how long they had owned the product (in months) because older brands or 
products may naturally be associated with lower quality. 
For key independent variables, I asked the extent to which participants felt they got 
their money’s worth from the product (residual value; 1 = definitely not, 7 = definitely 
yes), and the extent to which they thought they would use the product again in the future 
(problem inconclusiveness; 1 = highly unlikely, 7 = highly likely). Then, to measure 
probabilistic distance, I asked the same two questions from Study 3. That is, I asked 
participants if they were to purchase a product from the same store or company again how 
likely they think the problem would reoccur (1 = highly unlikely, 7 = highly likely), and 
how common or uncommon they think the problem with their product is (1 = highly 
uncommon / isolated incident, 7 = highly common / widely experienced). 
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To study the effect of product disposal on probabilistic expectations, I introduced a 
product disposal simulation exercise either before or after taking the probabilistic distance 
measures. The instructions of this simulation exercise read: 
 
“Imagine that you are getting rid of this product by either throwing it away or 
recycling it. For the purpose of this study, do not consider giving it away or 
donating. Vividly think about how you would get rid of this product in a step by 
step manner. Describe each of these steps, using the boxes below. For example, 
how would you clean or pack the product, and how would you take it out? Be as 
detailed and as specific as possible in your descriptions so that someone can follow 
exactly what you did by simply reading them.” 
 
Below the instruction, participants were shown text boxes where they could type in 
the answers. Total 5 text boxes were shown in the following format: “First I would…” [text 
box #1] “Then I would…” [text box #2] “Then I would…” [text box #3] “Then I would…” 
[text box #4] “Then I would…” [text box #5] “... and then finally it is gone, and I will never 
see it again.” Participants were encouraged to use all of the text boxes to facilitate mental 
simulation. 
To ensure that indeed the product disposal simulation induces psychological 
closure, I ran a separate pilot study with 107 participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk 
(51 females) who participated in exchange for a small monetary reward. In this pilot study, 
I measured participants’ experience of closure either before or after the product disposal 
simulation exercise. The product disposal simulation procedure in this pilot study was 
identical to that of the main study. Experienced closure was measured using the four 
manipulation check questions from Study 1, adapted to fit the product disposal context, e. 
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g. “My experience or time with this product feels like a ‘closed book’ to me” (α = .89). An 
Analysis of Variance revealed a significant main effect of the product disposal 
manipulation. Participants reported feeling a greater sense of closure if they were asked 
after (vs. before) completing the product disposal exercise (M = 4.29, SD = 1.55 vs. M = 
3.60, SD = 1.36; F(1, 105) = 6.00, p = .02). 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Using a linear regression model, I examined the predicted three-way interaction in 
the main study to see whether the effect of closure (or product disposal) on probabilistic 
distance depended on the extent to which people felt like they got their money’s worth 
from the product and the inconclusiveness of the product’s problem. The ownership 
duration measure (how long participants have owned the product) was also included in the 
model as a covariate. None of the independent variables were correlated with each other 
(ps > .1). The dependent variable was probabilistic distance, created by averaging the two 
items because their scores were highly correlated (r = .42, p < .0001). Note that, since the 
dependent measure captures how likely or prevalent the problem is, a high (low) score 
means low (high) probabilistic distance. 
The three-way interaction was significant (B = .10, SE = .05, p = .03; figure 1.6b) 
as well as the effect of the covariate (B = .001, SE < .0001, p = .03). Therefore, I conducted 
further analyses using the spotlight method (Irwin and McClelland 2001) to more closely 
examine the three-way interaction. Consistent with my prediction, the closure (product 
disposal) exercise significantly improved future expectations when participants did not get 
their money’s worth (-1SD) and the product’s problem was highly inconclusive (+1SD; B 
= -.98, SE = .37, p = .01). The effect of product disposal was not significant in any other 
spotlight analyses (ps > .2) 
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This study conceptually replicates the previous studies of the present research while 
highlighting a natural boundary condition of closure in a product disposal context. 
Specifically, I demonstrate that product disposal (as a way of inducing psychological 
closure) is effective in reducing perceptions of risk, or increasing probabilistic distance, 
when the product elicits strong negative emotional reactions. I show that this condition 
exists naturally among products with inconclusive problems that started to occur 
prematurely before consumers’ got their money’s worth from the products.  
 48 
Chapter 8: General Discussion 
The present research examines the role of closure on psychological distance and 
the mediating role of emotion in this relationship. I demonstrate that enhanced 
psychological closure causes events to seem more temporally distant (studies 1 and 4), 
probabilistically distant (studies 2, 3, 5, and 7), and physically distant (study 6). 
Specifically, these studies show that closure can make disappointing and embarrassing 
experiences seem further in the past and that closure can reduce the impact of product 
failure by making it seem less likely to reoccur. This is reflected in improved evaluations 
of product quality, reduced perceptions of how prevalent a product’s problem is, and 
lowered intention to purchase a warranty that covers similar issues. I also show that 
psychological closure can increase perceived physical distance from a tragic accident and 
decrease people’s willingness to take actions that can prevent future accidents from 
happening in that location. 
Importantly, I also demonstrate the role of emotional intensity as a process variable 
in the relationship between closure and psychological distance. This is accomplished 
through mediation analyses (studies 1 through 6), moderation by measured intensity of 
negative emotion (study 3), and moderation by manipulated intensity of negative emotion 
(studies 4 and 5). Finally, I observe these effects using multiple methods of inducing a 
sense of closure. These include a cognitive reappraisal task (Beike et al. 2007; Beike and 
Crone 2008), a behavioral task applying the embodiment paradigm (Gu et al. 2013; Li et 
al. 2010), and product disposal (Naylor 2006). 
THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
While prior work has examined the role of closure in coping with negative events 
(Beike et al. 2007; Li et al. 2010), moving on from difficult consumer choices (Gu et al. 
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2013), and making assessments of subjective knowledge after product learning (Namkoong 
and Gershoff 2013), the present research is the first to examine how closure affects 
consumer’s perceptual experiences. Despite a common need among people to achieve a 
sense of closure, and the existence in the marketplace of many services aimed at helping 
consumers gain closure (Berns 2011), there is very little research exploring this topic. The 
present research is one of the few to take a pioneering step in understanding the role of 
closure for consumers. 
There are important practical and managerial implications that flow from this 
research. Notably, the finding that closure decreases negative effects of product failure 
could be used by managers as part of a service recovery effort. More generally, however, 
understanding and influencing whether individuals have closure on any negative events 
could allow improved prediction of, and impact on, consumer behavior. For example, flood 
insurance purchases are said to decline after periods without flooding because consumers 
develop a  “false sense of security” (Sulzberger 2011). Likewise, natural disasters often 
bring about an increase in blood donation, but as time passes the donations decline (Miller 
2013). Potentially, efforts to keep these events from seeming closed, or in the past, could 
influence insurance purchase and donation behaviors so consumers might properly take 
care of themselves and others. 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
Future research should examine the effect of closure on other distance dimensions 
that were not included in the present research. For instance, in terms of social distance, I 
can predict that facilitating closure on social conflicts or social events will increase 
perceived dissimilarity with the others involved in the conflict, or decrease the strength of 
identification with the social group. 
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This research also opens up another question which is about the role of 
psychological distance in the experience of closure. Although the present research 
examines the impact closure has on psychological distance, it is also possible that a 
bidirectional relationship exists between the two constructs. For example, if psychological 
distance is increased, will the feeling of closure also be increased? The theory seems 
plausible. Prior research suggests there is a bidirectional relationship between 
psychological distance and emotional intensity; not only does emotional intensity decrease 
psychological distance (Van Boven et al. 2010), but psychological distance decreases 
emotional intensity (Williams and Bargh 2008). Based on these findings, one can make a 
prediction that creating psychological distance, and hence reducing negative emotional 
intensity, would help people feel closure more easily. 
Furthermore, in order to better understand the role of closure in consumers’ 
judgments, future research should expand the scope to include examinations of positive 
experiences. For example, a well-liked video game called Mass Effect 3 abruptly ended, 
leaving consumers feeling so disappointed by a lack of closure that the video game 
developer BioWare agreed to release an “extended cut” with an alternative ending (Lejacq 
2012). Applying the findings of the present research to this context, it is plausible that 
consumers of entertainment products with dramatic story arches (e.g., video games, 
movies, novel series) are highly influenced by the experience of closure or lack thereof, 
leading them to develop extreme psychological distance judgments. Closure’s influence on 
perceived temporal distance from positive events may be especially relevant, since it can 
influence consumers’ impatience or scheduling of the next similarly enjoyable experience. 
In terms of probabilistic or physical distance, making a positive event seem unlikely to 
reoccur by means of closure may make the event seem more scarce, exotic, or one-of-a-
 51 
kind. This may increase the desire to better protect and preserve the experience by 
obtaining memory pointers such as souvenirs (Zauberman, Ratner, and Kim 2009). 
BROADER IMPLICATIONS 
More generally, the topic of psychological closure offers to contribute to a number 
of other areas of research. First, closure contributes to the literature that emphasizes the 
importance of endings. Prior research highlights the critical role of gestalt profiles in the 
evaluation and planning of sequential events. For instance, gestalt properties, including 
whether experiences have relatively positive or negative endings, influence consumers’ 
hedonic evaluations (Ariely and Carmon 2000). Directly related are findings that show 
when a series of future events are presented as components of an integrated sequence, 
consumers arrange these events so that more pleasant ones come later in the sequence 
(Loewenstein and Prelec 1993). While research on gestalt profiles emphasizes the role of 
valence and intensity during the final moments of experiences, psychological closure 
examines how endings that provide (or do not provide) psychological resolution affect 
subsequent judgments, feelings, and behaviors. 
Second, research on psychological closure also contributes to the literature of the 
need for cognitive closure by considerably expanding the scope of thinking about the 
closure construct. Need for cognitive closure is a motivational construct specifically related 
to individuals’ need to reduce informational uncertainty or ambiguity (Webster and 
Kruglanski 1994). While related, psychological closure, or the lack of it, can arise from 
sources other than informational uncertainty. To illustrate, most people would find it 
unsettling to be missing the final piece from a jigsaw puzzle, even though having that piece 
presents no new information about the full image. Similarly, providing people with a sense 
of closure in the present research did not involve any learning of new information, but did 
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include cognitive reframing of events or behavioral procedures that could resolve 
psychological tension. 
In conclusion, the present research expands our knowledge about the role of 
psychological closure by demonstrating its effects on psychological distance judgments 
across dimensions of time, space, and risk. Despite the recent contributions in the fields of 
marketing and psychology, this is still a novel area with the potential for numerous future 
research opportunities. Practically, marketers may benefit from this research by 
recognizing how closure can influence people’s evaluations and future expectations 
regarding their products and brands.  
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2ND ESSAY – IT’S A WRAP! HOW CLOSURE INCREASES SUBJECTIVE 
KNOWLEDGE THROUGH SUMMARY REPRESENTATION 
Consumers often gather information to learn about products before making 
purchase decisions (Punj and Staelin 1983). At some point, they may encounter a cue that 
delivers a sense of closure to their learning. To illustrate, imagine a consumer who is 
learning about a complex product category, such as cheese at a gourmet tasting event. Upon 
finishing the last piece of cheese on the tasting list, seeing the server close the lid of the 
cheese plate, or reading the final sentence in an educational brochure, the consumer may 
experience a sense of closure. Likewise, a mother reading an online article about a 
potentially dangerous insect repellant chemical in a child-safety manual may feel a sense 
of closure as she closes the web browser before leaving the computer. How confident is 
the cheese-tasting consumer in his knowledge to select the right type of cheese for an 
upcoming party? Does the mother think she now knows enough to choose a safe insect 
repellent for her children? 
In this research I examine the role of psychological closure on subjective 
knowledge. More specifically, this research examines how psychological closure on a 
learning experience affects the way the learning experience becomes mentally represented 
and how knowledgeable consumers feel. I argue that even when actual learning is held 
constant, the increased feeling of closure on a learning experience can cause consumers to 
think they are more knowledgeable about the topic as a result of mental summarization or 
“wrapping up” of the learning experience. 
This is important to marketers because consumers’ assessments of their own 
knowledge may influence various aspects of decision-making. For instance, when lacking 
confidence about their product knowledge, consumers may delay making decisions. On the 
other hand, feeling highly knowledgeable may cause consumers to make decisions without 
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sufficient consideration, possibly compromising their safety or the quality of the decision. 
Indeed, consumers who feel subjectively knowledgeable make decisions more quickly, 
engage in more brief and selective information search, and are less likely to ask others for 
assistance (Brucks 1985; Moorman et al. 2004; Park and Lessig 1981; Radecki and Jaccard 
1995; Wood and Lynch 2002). 
As reviewed earlier, psychological closure has largely been studied in the context 
of coping with traumatic experiences such as regretful decisions, death of loved ones, 
relationship breakups, or national tragedies (Crawley 2010; Li et al. 2010; Melnick and 
Roos 2007). I draw upon this literature and extend it in two ways: by examining the effect 
of closure on a non-emotional consumer experience, i.e., product learning, and by 
examining the effect of closure on cognitive representations and meta-cognitive 
evaluations. Importantly, I demonstrate a mediating process by which closure influences 
subjective knowledge, that of summarized representation of learned material and extraction 
of higher “gist-level” cues. Now I review the literature that forms the basis of my 
theoretical prediction. 
PSYCHOLOGICAL CLOSURE AND SUMMARY REPRESENTATION 
Researchers have suggested the extraction of summary-level information as an 
efficient and parsimonious way of registering and storing information in memory because 
it does not include numerous low-level details (Ariely and Carmon 2000). Due to this 
efficiency, people may have developed a tendency to extract the gist as they gain closure. 
This would allow individuals to put a learning experience behind them and attend to other 
issues, while still keeping a summarized or essential version of it in memory. 
Prior work in Gestalt psychology provides additional insight and support of the 
notion that closure yields summarized representations of events. Perceptually, closure is a 
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mental process of sealing gaps and making connections between detached parts to 
recognize a complete gestalt, or meaningful shapes or patterns. This automatic mode of 
perception, also known as the “law of closure” (Wertheimer 1938, 1958), is a process of 
visual summarization or simplification because it entails extracting an overall coherent 
pattern from discrete units of visual information and encoding it at a higher level. Germane 
to the present work, Gestalt completion tasks involving visual closure have been used in 
prior literature to prime and measure higher-level processing of information (McCrea, 
Wieber, and Myers 2012; Smith and Trope 2006; Trope, Liberman, and Wakslak 2007; 
Wakslak et al. 2006). Similar to the process of visual closure on objects, I argue that 
psychological closure on experiences also encourages generating and extracting summary 
or gist-level information, making the experiences seem more cohesive as whole units. 
Psychological distance created by closure may also contribute to summarization of 
learned material. Psychological distance is defined as a “subjective experience that 
something is close or far away” (Trope and Liberman 2010, 1) and more psychologically 
distant targets are represented at higher levels in a more simplified, cohesive, and 
decontextualized manner (for review, see Trope and Liberman 2010). Closure may bring 
about psychological distance by creating a mental barrier that blocks information flow from 
the past. As noted above, closure has been conceptually associated with a sense of 
“pastness” (Beike et al. 2007). This notion is also supported by the first essay of this 
dissertation – although not statistically powerful, in many studies there is a direct positive 
effect of closure on psychological distance that is not explained by changes in emotional 
intensity. 
Further, Martin (1986) demonstrates that participants are more likely to use primed 
concepts in subsequent judgment tasks when the priming tasks had been interrupted (thus, 
open) compared to when the priming tasks were completed (thus, closed). This suggests 
 56 
that open past experiences permeate into the present, while closed ones are mentally 
separated from the present. Hence, the increased psychological distance from a closed 
learning experience may lead the experience to be summarized at a gist-level. 
Taken together, the present research proposes and demonstrates that psychological 
closure involves mentally wrapping up and creating summary representations of learning 
experiences. Higher, gist-level cues from the experience are extracted and made available 
as a result. For example, a customer visiting a cheese store may open a brochure to read 
about various facts about cheese in different eras and continents. With a feeling of closure, 
this customer would walk away from the learning experience remembering she just learned 
about “the history of cheese,” a gist-level, summarized representation of the learned 
material. Providing indirect support of this idea, prior research shows people often generate 
a “lesson” from closed (vs. open) life experiences suggesting there could be a process of 
abstraction involved (Beike et al. 2004). Lack of closure, by contrast, is unlikely to activate 
a summarization process; so gist-level cues are unlikely to be extracted and less readily 
available. The learned content is less likely to be coherent or tightly tied together under a 
broad umbrella, and will seem like a compilation of separate facts (e.g., “Ancient cheeses 
were sour and salty” and “Blue cheese used to be aged in caves”). 
The next section discusses the role of summary representation and higher, gist-level 
cues in individuals’ subjective knowledge estimates. 
SUMMARY REPRESENTATION AND SUBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE 
Prior research highlights the importance of understanding consumers’ estimates of 
their own knowledge as it relates to consumer decision-making. Consumers’ subjective 
knowledge has been shown to influence susceptibility to others’ recommendations (Brucks 
1985), behavioral application of knowledge (Phillips 1993; Traill, Chambers, and Butler 
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2012), motivation to learn new information (Radecki and Jaccard 1995; Wood and Lynch 
2002), speed of making decisions (Park and Lessig 1981), and degree of selective 
information search (Moorman et al. 2004). 
Unfortunately, what consumers think they know may not always be parallel to what 
they actually know (Alba and Hutchinson 2000; Carlson et al. 2009). A miscalibration 
between a consumer’s objective and subjective knowledge may occur when immediately 
accessible or salient information is a poor representation of objective knowledge (Alter, 
Oppenheimer, and Zemla 2010; Benjamin and Bjork 1996; Benjamin, Bjork, and Schwartz 
1998; Koriat 1993, 1995). As a result, consumers may feel more or less knowledgeable 
than they actually are. When consumers err this way, they may fail to seek out necessary 
information or assistance, choose inappropriate products for their objectives, and use 
products unsafely. In short, their decision quality may be undermined (Radecki and Jaccard 
1995). 
Relevant to the present research are findings that demonstrate higher-level cues 
often misguide individuals’ knowledge estimates. People tend to rely on higher-level cues 
to gauge how much they know or learned; yet these cues often poorly represent the amount 
and accuracy of concrete information available in memory. For example, the fuzzy-trace 
theory of memory provides a model for the interface between memory and judgment. It 
suggests that people form both verbatim and gist-level (or fuzzy) representations of events, 
and in general, they tend to rely on gist-level representations when available (Brainerd and 
Reyna 2002; Reyna and Brainerd 1995). The studies show that higher, more gist-dominant 
(vs. concrete, verbatim-dominant) cues increase false memories. For example, after 
learning a list of words that have a consistent theme (e.g., nurse, hospital, patient), 
individuals often report having seen words that were not presented (e.g., doctor), but fit the 
extracted theme (e.g., medical-related). In other words, gist-level traces highlight general 
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themes from learned information, and from these general themes, people make inferences 
and fill in details about what specifically was learned. 
Another example of higher-level cues misguiding subjective knowledge can be 
found in the literature of illusion of explanatory depth (IOED; Alter et al. 2010). IOED 
refers to a common tendency for people to overestimate their ability to explain concrete 
concepts or mechanisms because they rely on higher-level cues to gauge their knowledge. 
For instance, many people do not know that a zipper works by using a sliding wedge to 
properly position and successively bring together each hooked tooth into the hollow of the 
previous tooth. Yet, people feel they know how a zipper works because they have a good 
understanding of zippers at the gist-level; most know what one looks like, its functionality, 
and how to use one. 
With closure, individuals may mentally wrap up the learning experience, by 
extracting and generating an overall gist, and putting individual pieces of the learning 
experience together into a more cohesive and meaningful unit; and because of individuals’ 
tendency to naturally attend to higher-level cues when they are available (Alter et al. 2010; 
Brainerd and Reyna 2002; Navon 1977), psychological closure should heighten people’s 
subjective knowledge. In contrast, those who do not have closure are less likely experience 
heightened subjective knowledge because they do not have higher-level cues readily 
available upon subjective knowledge assessment. 
PREDICTIONS AND STUDIES OVERVIEW 
Seven experiments in the context of product learning demonstrate the effect of 
closure and the underlying summary representation mechanism. I apply multiple methods 
of manipulating high or low closure on learning experiences across various product 
categories. I also examine the mechanism by moderating the effect with attention focus 
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(higher- or lower-level focus) using several approaches. Studies 1a and 1b demonstrate the 
main effect of psychological closure on subjective knowledge and show that high (vs. low) 
psychological closure makes gist-level information more readily available. Study 2 
replicates the effect of psychological closure on subjective knowledge while 
simultaneously testing whether this effect is mediated by summary representation. 
Subsequent studies further examine the mechanism by demonstrating the moderating role 
of attention focus. Specifically, I demonstrate that directing participants’ attention to lower-
level information of the learning material causes those in the high (vs. low) closure 
condition to reduce their initially inflated perceptions of subjective knowledge (study 3). I 
further demonstrate this effect by directing people’s attention to lower- versus higher-level 
information using a mindset prime (study 4) and a temporal distance manipulation (study 
5). I also replicate the effect of closure using an embodiment paradigm while mimicking 
its effect through a direct manipulation of mental summarization to shed further light to the 
underlying mechanism (study 6).  
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Chapter 9: Studies 1A & 1B 
The purpose of these studies was to demonstrate the basic effects of psychological 
closure on summary representation of learned material and subjective knowledge. Study 
1a shows the basic effect of closure on subjective knowledge. Then, study 1b shows the 




Fifty-six participants (33 females) from Amazon Mechanical Turk who were 
located in the U.S. and had a 95% prior HIT acceptance rate participated in this survey in 
exchange for monetary payment (I applied the same selective criteria to other studies using 
Amazon participants in the present research). Participants were first asked to carefully read 
a three-page online booklet about cheese (Appendix A). This booklet had a professional-
looking cover page followed by short paragraphs about the history, production, 
categorization, and consumption of cheese. All pages of the booklet were presented on a 
single web browser so participants could scroll up and down to move freely between pages. 
Participants read the booklet for five minutes and were then randomly assigned to either 
the high-closure or low-closure condition. In this study, the closure manipulation was 
directly adapted from prior work in order to ensure my findings are comparable (Beike et 
al. 2007; Beike and Crone 2008; Beike et al. 2004). Specifically, participants responded to 
the following (low-closure condition in parentheses): 
 
Sometimes people say that they have (don’t have) “closure” on an experience; that 
the experience is like “a closed book” (“unfinished business”) to them. They say 
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this when the experience feels complete (incomplete), and they feel (don’t feel) 
ready to move on from it. Please briefly describe why the learning experience you 
just had – reading the informational booklet about cheese – could be considered 
CLOSED (NOT CLOSED) for you. Even if you don't agree that the learning 
experience is closed (not closed), it is important to us to know what kinds of things 
people come up with. 
 
On the next page, participants responded to the single-item subjective knowledge 
question “I feel like I learned a lot about cheese from the Cheese Booklet” on a 9-point 
Likert-type scale (1 = Not at all; 9 = Very much). 
Results 
The predicted main effect indicated that high (vs. low) closure led people to feel 
more knowledgeable as a result of reading the Cheese Booklet (M = 7.00 vs. M = 5.45; 
t(54) = 2.86, p < .01). 
STUDY 1B 
This study was designed to observe the way participants encode the learning 
experience in memory to examine closely the cognitive process activated through closure. 
Thus, after the learning experience and closure manipulation, I allowed participants to 
freely describe what they learned. Based on my theory, psychological closure should make 
the gist of the learning experience more readily available, and since these higher (vs. lower) 
level cues are more spontaneously attended to, they should be one of the first things that 
come to mind when remembering the experience. 
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Method 
One hundred and thirty-two participants (76 females) from Amazon Mechanical 
Turk participated in this survey in exchange for monetary payment. From the main 
questionnaire window, an online Smart TV Features Manual was launched into its own 
window on the screen when participants pressed a button. The manual was a compilation 
of 26 smart TV features with desciptions, and was divided in such a way that 5 or 6 items 
appeard on each page (Appendix B). Participants read one page at a time and were not 
allowed to go back to previous pages. 
Each page had a large heading on top that reminded participants how many pages 
they read so far, and the total number of pages in the manual (e.g., “Page 3 of 6”). On the 
last page, instead of seeing page 6, all participants were informed that their time was up for 
reading, that the last page of the manual would not be shown, and that they were to return 
to the main window to complete a questionnaire about the pages they were able to finish 
reading. This was to demonstrate the effect of closure on incomplete tasks. 
I manipulated psychological closure using an embodiment paradigm adapted from 
Gu et al. (2013) and Li et al. (2010) to fit an online learning context. Specifically, 
participants either closed the manual’s pop-up window (high-closure condition) or left it 
open in the background (low-closure condition) before returning to the main survey. As a 
cover story, I told participants this was “to ensure proper data registration between the two 
electronically linked survey windows.” 
After returning to the main questionnaire window, participants reported whether or 
not they have actually closed or opened the web browser as they were instructed. Then they 
continued to the next page to write an essay about what they learned. Specifically, they 
were instructed “Describe what you learned in the Smart TV Features Manual.” 
Participants freely responded without any length or time restrictions. Two independent 
 63 
coders blind of participants’ assigned treatment conditions coded these responses on 
whether the first statement was summary-oriented or feature-oriented. Summary-oriented 
statements included mentions about main takeaways or overall impressions (ex. “I learned 
that smart TVs have many features” or “A smart TV is like a smart phone”). Feature-
oriented statements mentioned specific details (ex. “I learned that I can type with my voice” 
or “The dual split screen is what really got my attention”). 
To examine further my prediction that psychological closure leads to a more 
summarized representation of learned material, I also asked three questions concerning the 
level of cohesiveness of the overall learning experience. On 7-point scales, participants 
indicated how much they agreed with the following statements: “Thinking back on the 
learning experience, the manual seemed cohesive; Thinking back on the learning 
experience, it seems like the information in the manual was scattered (reverse-coded); 
Thinking back on the learning experience, it seems like the content of the manual was 
integrative” (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). 
Results 
Three participants in the high closure condition left their web browsers open, and 
two participants in the low closure condition closed their web browsers, and thus, were 
excluded from the analyses. Including these participants did not alter the pattern of results. 
The agreement rate between two coders was high (91.3%), and disagreements were settled 
through discussion. As predicted, participants in the high-closure condition were more 
likely to mention a summary-oriented statement first in their description of the learning 
experience (80.65%) compared to those in the low-closure condition (60.0%; χ2(1, N = 
127) = 6.45, p = .01). 
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The three perceived cohesiveness questions measuring the extent to which the 
overall learning experience was represented in a summary form loaded together highly (α 
= .74), and hence, were averaged into a single measure. Further supporting the influence 
of closure on summarization, those in the high-closure condition perceived the Smart TV 
Features Manual more cohesively (M = 5.15) than low-closure (M = 4.72; t(125) = 2.08, p 
< .05). 
DISCUSSION 
Studies 1a and 1b demonstrate the basic effect of closure on subjective knowledge 
and cognitive representation. Study 1a shows that closure leads to greater subjective 
knowledge after a learning experience. Study 1b shows that closure leads to greater 
summarization of learned material. The following studies further explore these effects, 
illustrating the robustness of the proposed relationship while putting greater focus on 
testing the underlying mechanism. 
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Chapter 10: Study 2 
The purpose of study 2 was threefold; to replicate the effect of closure on subjective 
knowledge, test for the hypothesized mediating mechanism, and show that the effect is not 
due to a change in actual knowledge about the topic. Specifically, I use the learning 
experience from study 1a, but include measures to test for perceptions of closure as a 
manipulation check and expand my measure of subjective knowledge to include multiple 
items for robustness. I also use the three item cohesiveness measure from study 1b to test 
whether summary representation mediates the effect of closure on subjective knowledge. 
In addition, I measure objective knowledge in order to show that only subjective 
knowledge is influenced by closure. 
METHOD 
Participants and design 
One hundred and thirty-seven online respondents on Amazon Mechanical Turk (71 
females) participated in study 2 in exchange for monetary payment. The study was a simple 
two-cell design with psychological closure as a between subject factor. 
Procedure 
Participants were given as much time as they wanted to read the Cheese Booklet 
used in study 1a. After reading the entire booklet, participants were randomly assigned to 
either a high or low closure condition. Closure was manipulated by having participants 
generate reasons why they might consider the learning experience as either closed or open 
(reason-listing task from study 1a; Beike et al. 2007; Beike and Crone 2008). 
To ensure the manipulation of psychological closure was successful, I asked four 
questions on participants’ self-reported experience of closure, also from previous research, 
but adapted to fit the learning context (Beike et al. 2007; Crawley 2010; Savitsky et al. 
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1997): “The learning experience I had feels complete to me; The learning experience I had 
feels like a ‘closed book’ to me; The learning experience I had feels like ‘unfinished 
business’ to me (reverse-coded); I feel ready to move on from the learning experience” (1 
= not at all, 7 = very much). 
Perceived cohesiveness was measured using the same three questions used in study 
1b, followed by five questions on subjective knowledge. On 7-point Likert-type scales, 
participants indicated the extent to which they agreed with each of the five statements 
regarding their knowledge gained from the learning experience: “Overall, I learned a lot 
from the Cheese Booklet; Because of the learning experience, I am now knowledgeable 
about cheese in general; The Cheese Booklet has provided an effective learning experience; 
The learning experience I had will help me in the future when purchasing cheese; The 
learning experience I had will help me in the future when eating/consuming cheese” (1 = 
not at all, 7 = very much). Finally, objective knowledge was measured with an 
unanticipated quiz consisting of 8 true/false questions and 4 multiple-choice questions 
testing what had been learned from the booklet. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Manipulation check 
A single factor emerged from the four psychological closure questions (α = .89), so 
an averaged composite measure was created for self-reported experience of psychological 
closure. As intended, participants in the high-closure condition reported experiencing more 
closure (M = 5.70) compared to those in the low-closure condition (M = 4.60; t(135) = 
4.62, p < .001). 
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Objective knowledge 
Participants’ quiz scores ranged from 1 to 12 out of a possible score of 12 correct 
answers, with a mean of 7.31, median of 7, and standard deviation of 1.96. There was no 
difference in participants’ quiz scores by closure condition (t(135) = .14, NS). Controlling 
for participants’ quiz scores did not alter the pattern of results in subsequent analyses. 
Subjective knowledge and perceived cohesiveness and mediation 
I averaged the responses from the five questions on subjective knowledge (α = .81) 
and three questions on perceived cohesiveness (α = .69) to create a composite measure for 
each construct. Replicating study 1a, participants in the high-closure condition indicated 
greater subjective knowledge (M = 5.46) compared to those in the low-closure condition 
(M = 5.11; t(135) = 2.12, p < .05). Also providing support for the proposed mechanism, 
and replicating study 1b, those in the high-closure condition also perceived the learning 
experience more cohesively (M = 5.59) compared to those in the low-closure condition (M 
= 5.14; t(135) = 2.26, p < .05). To test whether perceived cohesiveness mediated the effect 
of closure on subjective knowledge I used a bootstrap analysis (Preacher and Hayes 2008; 
Zhao, Lynch, and Chen 2010). Using 5,000 bootstrapping resamples, I found the total 
indirect effect through perceived cohesiveness had a 95% bias-correct and accelerated 
(BCa) confidence interval (CI) of 0.01 and .16, indicating significant mediation (i.e., CI 
does not include zero). 
Test against normative alternative explanation 
One may argue that the high and low psychological closure manipulations used in 
this study provided cues to participants that the learning experience of the survey was either 
objectively complete or incomplete. That is, being asked to write about why the learning 
experience is closed may be erroneously interpreted as a signal that the experimenter has 
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provided a complete learning experience in which there is nothing else to be learned, and 
being asked to write about why the experience is not closed may be interpreted as a signal 
that more learning on the topic will occur later in the survey. This could potentially provide 
a higher normative standard for the learning against which participants form their subject 
knowledge evaluations. 
To address this explanation, I conducted separate correlational analyses within each 
closure condition. If my argument holds, then regardless of the manipulation task employed 
by this study, I should find that self-reported experience of closure is positively correlated 
with perceived cohesiveness and subjective knowledge. That is, even if my manipulations 
signaled a norm about the amount that could be learned, within each condition, I still 
expected that those who naturally feel less closure would report less cohesion and less 
subjective knowledge, and those who feel more closure would report more cohesion and 
higher subjective knowledge. 
Indeed, all three constructs were significantly correlated with each other even when 
the high and low closure conditions were examined separately (table 2.1). Moreover, the 
mediation path of measured closure, perceived cohesiveness, and subjective knowledge 
remained significant even after controlling for participants’ assigned closure manipulation 
condition (n boots = 5,000; 95% BCa CI [.025, .150]). 
Discussion 
This study replicates and extends studies 1a and 1b. I demonstrate that 
psychological closure leads to a more summarized representation of the learning 
experience as indicated by greater perceived cohesiveness of the learned material. 
Importantly, this representation mediated the positive effect of psychological closure on 
subjective knowledge. In addition, I show no differences in actual knowledge, and provide 
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evidence that the effect of closure was neither due to what was actually learned nor to an 
inferred norm of what the experimenter deemed the scope of the learning experience. 
The following experiments shed light to the mechanism using a different approach; 
that is, by moderating participants’ attention focus so they are more likely to rely on higher 
or lower level cues when judging their subjective knowledge. Psychological closure 
triggers the process of summarization and gist-extraction. Although people tend to rely 
spontaneously on these higher, gist-level cues when available, various situational factors 
may redirect attention to lower-level cues (Alter et al. 2010; Miller 1981). Such direction 
of attention should diminish the effect of closure on subjective knowledge. I demonstrate 
this moderating effect by presenting participants with concrete information from the 
learning material (study 3), putting participants in a concrete (vs. abstract) mindset (study 
4), and providing a proximal (vs. distant) temporal context (study 5).  
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Chapter 11: Study 3 
The purpose of this study was to show the moderating influence of directing 
attention to lower-level cues, and to examine within-participant evidence of subjective 
knowledge change. By directing people to consider lower-level cues when gauging their 
subjective knowledge, I expect to attenuate the effect of psychological closure. The within 
subject paradigm in this study adds a unique contribution because it also allows me to test 
whether the effect of closure is driven by overestimated subjective knowledge in the high-
closure condition or underestimated subjective knowledge in the low-closure condition. 
Based on my theory that psychological closure heightens subjective knowledge 
through available and accessible gist-level cues, I predicted that participants in the high-
closure condition would make greater estimates of subjective knowledge than those in the 
low-closure condition. However, a subsequent manipulation that highlights concrete 
aspects of what was just learned should lead those who were in the high-closure condition 
to decrease their estimates of subjective knowledge, while those from the low-closure 
condition should not. This would be consistent with prior work in the IOED, which is also 
thought to come about by reliance on higher-level cues, but is attenuated by direction to 
lower-level cues (Alter et al. 2010). In their studies, participants were initially asked to 
gauge their ability to explain a particular process, and then asked again after an actual 
attempt at explanation. The degree of miscalibration of explanatory ability was measured 
by taking the difference between the two ability estimates. 
Finally, for robustness, I add a new factor in this study to ensure that the effect of 
closure on subjective knowledge is not due to low accuracy motivation. I also expand the 
topic of the learning material to insect repellent chemicals. 
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METHOD 
Participants and design 
One hundred and ninety-three individuals (90 females) from both Amazon 
Mechanical Turk and the participant pool at a large public university completed this study. 
My findings were not qualified by a respondent source; hence, the two datasets were 
consolidated. The experiment was a 2 (closure: high vs. low) x 2 (time of subjective 
knowledge measurement: before vs. after concrete cue presentation) x 2 (accuracy 
motivation: high vs. control) mixed-participants design. The closure manipulation and 
accuracy motivation manipulation were between-participants factors while the time of 
subjective knowledge measurement was a repeated within-participants factor. 
Procedure 
All participants first read an online booklet about an insect repellant chemical 
DEET (Appendix C). This category was selected because it is a common product ingredient 
that requires particular knowledge in order to use safely. The four-page booklet included 
information about the origin, function, and safe use of the chemical insect repellant DEET. 
To ensure the booklet was realistic, it was modeled after an actual public health 
organization booklet about DEET designed to help consumers use the product safely. 
Each page was presented on the screen individually and participants were allowed 
to spend as much time as they wanted before moving from one page to the next. On each 
page, the total and current page information was clearly stated on top of the screen (e.g., 
“Page 2 of 4”). This was done to ensure participants had information about where they 
were in the booklet and how much more of the booklet remained. After participants 
finished reading the entire booklet (i.e., having completed reading “Page 4 of 4”), they 
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were randomly assigned to either a high or low psychological closure condition with the 
same reason-listing task and manipulation check questions (α = .89) from study 2. 
To ensure my effects are robust against varying levels of accuracy motivation, I 
randomly assigned half of my participants to the high accuracy motivation condition. In 
this condition, participants were given the following instruction on top of the page where 
they made initial assessments of their subjective knowledge (T1): “TRY TO BE AS 
ACCURATE AS YOU CAN – Later in this survey, we will ask you to explain what you 
learned from the DEET Booklet to see how accurate you were when evaluating your 
learning experience in this page.” In the control condition, participants were simply told to 
answer the subjective knowledge questions based on their own thoughts and feelings. 
Participants then reported their subjective knowledge (T1), completed an easy quiz 
asking questions from the DEET booklet (concrete cue presentation), and reported their 
subjective knowledge again (T2). The subjective knowledge measures were nearly 
identical to study 2 with the following exceptions. First, the scale for the subjective 
knowledge measures was anchored from -5 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). 
Second, the wording of the questions was adapted to fit the DEET product category. 
Unlike in study 2, the quiz was designed not to test objective knowledge per se, but 
to present concrete information from the learning material so it redirects people’s attention 
to their lower-level cues when gauging their subjective knowledge at T2. A total of 4 
multiple-choice (e.g., “DEET was originally tested as a(n) ________”) and 6 true/false 
questions (e.g., “30% DEET is safe to use on children.”) were created for this purpose. 
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Manipulation check 
The psychological closure manipulation was successful. As expected, participants 
in the high-closure condition (M = 5.55) reported feeling more closure than those in the 
low-closure condition (M = 4.25; t(191) = 6.05, p < .001). 
Concrete cue presentation 
Participants’ scores on the concrete cue quiz ranged from 3 to 10 (out of a total 
possible score of 10), with a mean of 7.67 (SD = 1.54) and median of 8. As intended, the 
quiz was fairly easy and participants’ performance was not influenced by any of my 
treatments nor their interactions (ps > .5). 
Subjective knowledge 
The subjective knowledge questions loaded together as a single factor and showed 
high inter-item reliability at both T1 and T2 (α = .92 and .95, respectively). Hence, I 
averaged the items to create a single subjective knowledge measure for each of the time 
periods. This data was analyzed as a mixed three-way ANOVA with closure (high vs. low) 
and accuracy motivation (high vs. control) as between-participants factors and time of 
subjective knowledge measurement (before vs. after concrete cueing) as a within-
participants factor. There was a main effect of measurement timing so that participants’ 
subjective knowledge was higher at T1 versus T2 (MT1 = 2.29 vs. MT2 =2.13; F(1, 189) = 
6.59, p < .05). Importantly, however, this effect was qualified by its interaction with closure 
as I predicted (F(1, 189) = 5.40, p < .05; figure 2.1). No other interactions or main effects 
were significant (ps > .1). 
First, replicating previous studies, subjective knowledge prior to exposure to 
concrete cues (T1) was higher in the high-closure condition (M = 2.56) than in the low (M 
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= 2.03; F(1, 189) = 4.85, p < .05). Next, I examined differences in participants’ estimates 
of subjective knowledge before and after taking the concrete knowledge quiz. As expected, 
participants in the high-closure condition significantly reduced their subjective knowledge 
estimates after they were presented with concrete quiz questions (MT1 = 2.56 vs. MT2 =2.25; 
F(1, 189) = 11.76, p = .001). Those in the low-closure condition did not adjust their 
subjective knowledge estimates at T2 (MT1 = 2.03 vs. MT2 = 2.01; F(1, 189) = .03, NS). As 
a result of the downward adjustment in the high-closure condition, there was no difference 
between the two closure conditions at T2 (F(1, 189) = .87, NS). 
Test against normative alternative explanation 
Repeating the steps of study 2, I again examined the correlational relationship 
between experienced closure and subjective knowledge separately within high and low 
closure conditions. A consistent pattern emerged. That is, experienced psychological 
closure was positively correlated with subjective knowledge at both T1 and T2 within both 
high-closure condition (T1: r = .54, p < .001; T2: r = .49, p < .001) and low-closure 
condition (T1: r = .44, p < .001; T1: r = .40, p < .001). 
Discussion 
Study 3 adds supporting evidence using a repeated measure design. Supporting my 
hypotheses, and replicating studies 1a and 2, participants in the high-closure condition 
initially estimated greater subjective knowledge than those in the low-closure condition, 
and this effect was robust against high accuracy motivation. In addition, I again found that 
the positive relationship between experienced closure and subjective knowledge was 
significant even when examined separately within each closure conditions; this suggests 
that my effect is not dependent on the type of closure manipulation task used in this study. 
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Importantly, after being presented with concrete cues in the form of an easy quiz, 
participants in the high-closure condition made significant downward adjustments, 
suggesting the quiz made them find their initial assessment to be too high. Participants in 
the low-closure condition, on the contrary, maintained their subjective knowledge 
estimates, suggesting they found the initial judgment to be an accurate assessment of their 
knowledge. 
This distinct adjustment pattern between the high and low closure conditions after 
being presented with concrete cues from the learned material provides strong evidence that 
heightened subjective knowledge is driven by individual’s reliance on higher, gist-level 
cues made available by closure. When participants’ attentions were guided to focus on 
lower-level cues through the concrete facts quiz, those in the high-closure condition made 
downward-adjustments to their initially inflated subjective knowledge judgments. These 
findings also demonstrate that the difference in subjective knowledge between the high and 
low closure conditions is driven by overestimation with high-closure rather than 
underestimation with low-closure. 
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Chapter 12: Study 4 
The purpose of study 4 was to provide further evidence for the cognitive mechanism 
underlying the effect of psychological closure on subjective knowledge. I have argued and 
demonstrated that psychological closure facilitates the process of wrapping up or 
summarizing a learning experience, making higher gist-level cues from the experience 
readily available in memory; reliance on these cues increases subjective knowledge. Prior 
research found, when individuals were probed about their knowledge concerning a topic, 
they relied on higher, gist-level cues unless specifically prompted to seek lower-level cues 
(Alter et al. 2010). Based on these arguments, high (vs. low) closure should increase 
subjective knowledge in the absence of any external influence that directs one’s focus, and 
also when one’s focus is directed to higher (vs. lower) level cues. However, this effect of 
high closure should diminish when one is directed to focus on lower-level cues. For people 
with low closure, who presumably would not have had the opportunity to mentally wrap 
up the experience, directing their attention to a higher or lower level should not affect 
subjective knowledge, since only lower level cues would be available in their 
representation of the learning experience. 
While study 3 used presentation of concrete information from the learning 
experience to direct participants’ attention to lower-level cues, this study used a mindset 
prime. Specifically, I primed participants with a concrete or abstract mindset based on prior 
work showing that a concrete mindset increases focus on local features and specific details, 
whereas an abstract mindset increases focus on the big picture and gist when making 
judgments (for review, see Shapira et al. 2012). I expected that high (vs. low) closure 
participants would feel more knowledgeable when primed with an abstract mindset because 
they would access and rely on higher level cues extracted through closure. However, when 
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primed with a concrete mindset, I expected the effects of closure would be attenuated, as 
participants in both closure conditions would focus their attention on concrete cues. 
METHOD 
Participants and design 
Two hundred and twenty undergraduate students (99 females) at a large public 
university participated in the study in exchange for extra course credit. The experiment was 
a 2 (psychological closure: high vs. low) x 2 (mindset: abstract vs. concrete) between-
participants design. 
Procedure 
All participants first completed a learning phase that was identical to study 2 (i.e., 
reading the Cheese Booklet) and completed the reason-listing closure manipulation task 
also used in prior studies. Then, participants engaged in a mindset activation task designed 
to elicit either an abstract or a concrete mindset, as used in previous research (Liberman et 
al. 2007). For this manipulation, six common activities, including opening a new bank 
account, subscribing to a newspaper, and buying a computer, were presented to 
participants. In the abstract mindset condition, participants were asked to describe why 
someone would carry out these activities. Thinking about why someone performs activities 
leads to consideration of superordinate goals and higher-level meanings activating an 
abstract mindset; for example, one might open a bank account to save for future goals. 
Participants in the concrete mindset condition, on the other hand, wrote about how someone 
would carry out the activities; for example, opening a bank account involves subtasks such 
as gathering documents, taking the bus to the bank, waiting in line, and making a deposit. 
Thinking about how activities are performed leads to consideration of subordinate aspects 
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such as detailed behaviors, which has been shown to activate a concrete mindset (Freitas, 
Gollwitzer, and Trope 2004; Vallacher and Wegner 1989). 
I then asked participants to rate how knowledgeable they felt as a result of the 
learning experience – reading the cheese booklet – by providing ratings of agreement with 
two statements: “I feel like I learned a lot about cheese from the cheese booklet,” and “After 
the learning experience, I feel very knowledgeable about cheese.” Participants rated their 
agreement with each statement on 9-point scales (1 = strongly disagree, 9 = strongly agree). 
Finally, participants provided a measure of objective knowledge learned from the booklet. 
Specifically, they took an unanticipated quiz with 20 questions covering knowledge of 
information that had appeared in the booklet. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Subjective knowledge 
The two subjective knowledge items were highly correlated (α = .82), so they were 
averaged to create a single composite measure. An ANOVA revealed a significant 
interaction between closure and construal level on subjective knowledge (F(1, 216) = 4.67, 
p < .05; figure 2.2). Further analyses of simple main effects supported my theory. In the 
abstract mindset condition, those in the high-closure condition estimated they knew more 
(M = 6.35) compared to those in the low-closure condition (M = 5.68; F(1, 216)  = 5.20, 
p < .05). In the concrete mindset condition, this difference was attenuated so that there was 
no difference between the high versus low closure conditions (M = 5.74 vs. M = 5.96; F(1, 
216) = .59, NS). 
Also as predicted, for participants who were in the high-closure condition, being in 
an abstract mindset led to greater subjective knowledge (M = 6.35) than being in a concrete 
mindset (M = 5.74; F(1, 216)  = 4.17, p < .05); this difference was not significant within 
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the low-closure condition (M = 5.68 vs. M = 5.96; F(1, 216) = .99, NS). Consistently, a 
planned contrast revealed participants in the high closure and abstract construal condition 
reported a significantly higher level of subjective knowledge (M = 6.35) compared to the 
remaining three groups of participants (M = 5.79; F(1, 216) = 2.25; p < .05). 
Objective knowledge 
Despite differences in subjective knowledge estimates dependent on closure, 
objective measures of knowledge did not show this pattern. Participants’ scores ranged 
from 8 to 19 out of a possible score of 20 (each correct question counted as 1 point) with a 
mean of 14.66 (SD = 2.30) and a median of 15. A 2 (closure) x 2 (mindset) ANOVA 
showed no significant main effect of closure on quiz performance (F(1, 216) = .03, NS) 
nor a significant interaction (F(1, 216) = 1.07, NS). There was, however, a significant main 
effect of mindset. Participants who were in the concrete mindset condition (M = 14.99) 
scored higher than those in the abstract mindset condition, (M = 14.32; t(218) = 2.18, p < 
.05) which could be a result of fit between a concrete mindset and recognizing individual 
facts. 
Discussion 
This study provides further evidence that closure increases estimates of subjective 
knowledge through summary representation that extracts gist-level information. As 
expected, the positive effect of psychological closure on subjective knowledge was 
replicated when participants were directed to focus on higher-level cues (abstract mindset); 
however, this relationship was attenuated when there was greater focus on lower-level cues 
(concrete mindset). Also consistent with my theory, participants in the high-closure 
condition reported feeling more knowledgeable when they focused on higher- vs. lower-
level cues; but level of focus did not affect participants with low-closure. This conceptually 
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replicates the distinct adjustment patterns exhibited between high and low closure 
conditions in study 3. 
Importantly, the above findings cannot be explained by objective knowledge, as 
objective knowledge is not influenced by closure manipulations. The fact that concrete (vs. 
abstract) mindset resulted in better quiz performance also rules out the possibility that the 
quiz was not sensitive enough to capture any difference in objective knowledge. Moreover, 
statistically controlling for objective knowledge in my analyses does not weaken the effect 
of closure on subjective knowledge. 
It is also crucial to note that the results of this study help rule out a potential 
alternative explanation of the effect of closure on subjective knowledge, which is that 
closure simply enhances feelings of completion or fulfillment. If closure increases 
subjective knowledge by making people feel they have reached a certain standard, I would 
not have found that putting people in a concrete mindset weakened the effect of closure, 
which is what I found in this study. Thus, my findings are consistent with the proposed 
mechanism of this research, which is the reliance on gist-level cues made available as a 
result of psychological closure and mental summarization. I return to this in the next study 
and again in the general discussion. 
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Chapter 13: Study 5 
The purpose of study 5 was to conceptually replicate the findings of the previous 
study and to add robustness and ecological validity in several ways. First, instead of the 
reason-listing task used in the previous studies and prior literature (Beike et al. 2007; Beike 
and Crone 2008), this study uses task-framing to create high or low feelings of closure. 
Specifically, after completing the learning experience, participants were explicitly told 
either that the subjective knowledge measures were part of a new task (high-closure on 
learning experience at the point of estimating subjective knowledge), or that the subjective 
knowledge measures were a continuation of the learning experience task (low-closure on 
learning experience when estimating subjective knowledge). Along with study 1b, this 
study increases the practical relevance of the literature by examining a closure-inducing 
cue that is more likely to be experienced in a consumer setting and is potentially under the 
control of a marketer. 
Second, this study activates construal level mindsets by employing a temporal 
context (close vs. distant future) rather than the priming task used in study 4. Temporal 
distance influences mindsets by activating more concrete, lower-level focus when 
considering the close future and more abstract, higher-level focus when considering the 
distant future (Liberman, Sagristano, and Trope 2002). It has been used in prior research 
to successfully induce abstract or concrete thinking modes (Giacomantonio, De Dreu, and 
Mannetti 2010; Plaks, McNichols, and Fortune 2009). 
Based on my theory, and conceptually replicating studies 3 and 4, closure should 
increase subjective knowledge estimates when learned information is expected to be used 
in the distant future (i.e., when consumers are in an abstract mindset). To reiterate, this is 
also how people would spontaneously gauge subjective knowledge even without any 
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mindset prime, as demonstrated in prior studies 1a, 2, and 3. However, the effect of closure 
on subjective knowledge should be attenuated when learned information is expected to be 
used in the close future (i.e., when consumers are in a concrete mindset). In addition, among 
participants with high-closure, a temporally distant (vs. close) perspective would result in 
greater subjective knowledge, but this effect should be attenuated in the low-closure 
condition. Note that my prediction to find a significant effect of closure in the temporally 
distant (vs. close) condition makes it a conservative test for my theory, as it is less likely 
for people to consider that a learning experience now would be helpful in the distant future 
(i.e., next year). 
METHOD 
Participants and design 
One hundred and twenty-seven undergraduate students (74 females) at a large 
public university participated in the study for extra course credit. The experiment was a 2 
(closure: high vs. low) x 2 (psychological distance: close vs. distant) between-participants 
design. 
Procedure 
Participants first completed a learning phase followed by the closure manipulation. 
All participants read the same DEET booklet used in study 3. As in study 3, each page was 
presented on the screen individually. The total and current page information was clearly 
stated on top of the screen (e.g., “Page 2 of 4”) to ensure participants had information about 
where they were in the booklet and how much more of the booklet remained. 
After participants finished reading the entire booklet (i.e., having completed 
reading “Page 4 of 4”), psychological closure was manipulated via task-framing. Based on 
random assignment, I told participants they either had or had not come to the end of the 
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general survey activity. More specifically, participants in the high-closure condition were 
brought to a screen with subjective knowledge questions under an instruction that said 
“You have now completed the main part of today's survey. Before submitting your 
responses and leaving the survey station, please answer some additional questions” in order 
to create mental segregation from the learning experience and the effect of “moving on.” 
Participants in the low-closure condition, on the other hand, saw a screen with subjective 
knowledge questions that said, “Wait! Before you go to the next part of the survey, please 
answer the questions below” so the subjective knowledge questions were presented as a 
continuation of the ongoing learning experience. 
I also manipulated the temporal context for participants’ evaluations of their 
knowledge about DEET. Participants were assigned to either a temporally distant or 
proximal condition so they rely on higher or lower level information, respectively. The 
following instruction was used (proximal condition in parentheses): “Imagine that next 
year (vs. right now) you are going on a trip where you might take advantage of what you 
just read.” 
After the task-framing and temporal distance manipulations, participants evaluated 
their subjective knowledge. The subjective knowledge questions were the same as study 3, 
anchored from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). Finally, I gave participants an unanticipated 
quiz to measure their objective knowledge. Because the quiz from study 3 was designed to 
be easy, which served the purpose of cuing concrete details, I modified it to be slightly 
more difficult for study 5, resulting in 4 multiple-choice questions and 9 true/false 
questions based on information from the DEET booklet. 
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Subjective knowledge 
A single factor emerged from these questions (α = .87). Hence, the responses were 
averaged to create a single subjective knowledge measure. As expected, a 2 (closure) x 2 
(temporal distance) ANOVA revealed a significant two-way interaction (F(1, 123) = 4.00, 
p < .05; figure 2.3). Specific comparisons further supported my theory. When evaluating 
for a distant future, in which participants were more likely to rely on available higher-level 
cues, participants in the high (vs. low) closure condition reported feeling greater subjective 
knowledge (M = 5.63 vs. M = 4.94; F(1, 123) = 6.51, p = .01). For the proximal future 
conditions, when people are likely to draw on available lower-level cues, there was no 
difference in subjective knowledge between the high versus low closure conditions (M = 
4.94 vs. M = 5.01; F(1, 123) = .08, NS). 
Also consistent with my prediction, within the high-closure condition, those 
evaluating for the distant future had higher subjective knowledge (M = 5.63) compared to 
those evaluating for the proximal future (M = 4.94; F(1, 123) = 6.36, p = .01). Temporal 
distance had no such impact in the low-closure conditions (M = 4.94 vs. M = 5.01; F(1, 
123) = .07, NS). A planned contrast revealed that participants who were induced to feel a 
high sense of closure and evaluated their knowledge in a temporally distant context felt 
more knowledgeable (M = 5.63) compared to the other three groups of participants (M = 
4.97; t(123) = 3.04; p < .01). 
Objective knowledge 
Participants’ scores on the objective knowledge quiz ranged from 4 to 12 out of the 
possible total of 13 with a mean of 8.83, a median of 9, and a standard deviation of 1.84. 
 85 
As intended, the quiz was significantly more difficult than in study 3 (performance 
standardized to total 100 points; Mstudy5 = 68 vs. Mstudy3 = 77; t(318) = 5.13, p < .001). 
Interestingly, a significant interaction emerged between closure and temporal 
distance for objective knowledge (F(1, 123) = 5.17, p < .05). Within the distant future 
condition, participants in the high (vs. low) closure condition performed worse on the quiz 
(M = 8.25 vs. M = 9.23; F(1, 123) = 4.55, p < .05), and within the high closure condition, 
participants in the temporally distant (vs. close) condition performed worse (M = 8.25 vs. 
M = 9.21; F(1, 123) = 4.23, p < .05). A follow-up comparison revealed that participants in 
the high-closure and distant-context group performed significantly worse (M = 8.25) 
compared to the rest of the groups (M = 9.03; t(123) = 2.15, p < .05). Note this is the exact 
opposite pattern of what was observed in participants’ subjective knowledge estimates: 
participants who were most psychologically removed from the learning experience (high-
closure and distant-context), presumably with more available higher-level cues and 
stronger higher-level focus, reported the highest levels of subjective knowledge, but 
paradoxically remembered the fewest details compared to those in all other groups. 
Discussion 
These findings further support my theory by conceptually replicating the results of 
study 4 while adding robustness. Using different methods to manipulate both psychological 
closure and construal level, I again found that the effect of high versus low closure on 
subjective knowledge replicates when thinking abstractly (reliance on more gist-level 
cues), but is diminished when thinking concretely (reliance on lower-level cues). 
Additionally, relying more on gist-level cues (as opposed to lower-level cues) increased 
subjective knowledge in the high-closure condition, but not in the low-closure condition. 
The closure and construal manipulations used in this study add robustness to my findings, 
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and increase external validity by integrating natural situational contexts into the self-
assessment of knowledge. 
The findings of this study also highlight the powerful nature of psychological 
closure, as it is likely difficult for an individual to think that any particular learning material 
will be useful after a year (vs. right now). Nonetheless, I found that participants with high 
closure felt more knowledgeable when they imagined using the acquired knowledge in a 
distant (vs. close) future. As in study 4, these findings are more consistent with my 
proposed mechanism, rather than the potential alternative mechanism that closure simply 
makes people feel more finished; the alternative mechanism would not predict the 
moderation by temporal context. 
Moreover, the pattern of results cannot be explained by actual differences in 
objective knowledge because objective knowledge was affected in the opposite direction 
and controlling for objective knowledge did not change the pattern of my results. In this 
study, closure and abstract mindset (vs. all other treatments) resulted in less knowledge 
about concrete facts, but greater feeling of knowledgeableness. The effects on objective 
knowledge are not inconsistent with previous work. For example, studies of negative 
emotional experiences have found that people tend to recall fewer emotion-related details 
after achieving closure (Beike and Wirth-Beaumont 2005; Li et al. 2010). I provide further 
thoughts in the General Discussion about the role of closure in objective knowledge. 
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Chapter 14: Study 6 
This study served two important purposes. One was to further examine the process 
of psychological closure and how it increases subjective knowledge. I proposed that closure 
increases subjective knowledge through a mental wrap up process which summarizes the 
learning experience at a higher, more abstract level. On the other hand, individuals who 
lack closure after learning are deprived of this opportunity to extract higher level 
information. This study highlights this process by adding a condition that directly 
manipulates mental summarization. More specifically, I demonstrate in this study that, 
even for participants who lack closure (low closure condition), I can mimic the effect of 
high closure on subjective knowledge by adding a recap session that presents higher-level 
information from the learning experience. In contrast, a recap session that presents lower-
level information from the learning experience should not increase subjective knowledge 
among low closure participants. 
The second goal of this study was to examine an important downstream 
consequence of subjective knowledge, namely, external information search. Consumers 
who feel less knowledgeable about a product are more likely to seek recommendations and 
search for additional information (Brucks 1985; Radecki and Jaccard 1995). Therefore, I 
predicted a mirroring pattern from previous studies, such that participants who had had 
closure or had formed a summary representation of the learning experience would be the 
ones who feel the lowest need to seek additional information. 
METHOD 
Participants and design 
One hundred and thirty-six participants on Amazon Mechanical Turk completed 
the online survey in exchange for a small monetary reward. The experiment was a 2 
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(closure: high vs. low) x 3 (cue-level: abstract vs. concrete vs. no cues) between-
participants design. 
Procedure 
Participants engaged in the same cheese-learning experience as in prior studies, i.e., 
reading the Cheese Booklet. They clicked a button on their screen to open a new window 
that was the booklet. Similar to study 1b, I told participants that the booklet consisted of 
total 4 pages when in fact there were only 3 pages. The page number of the booklet was 
clearly stated on top of the window (e.g., “Page 1 of 4”). When participants reached page 
3, they were told that their time was up, and that they would not be reading the final page 
of the booklet. They were also told they would only be asked questions from the pages that 
they read. 
Then, I manipulated high or low feelings of closure using the same embodiment 
paradigm used in study 1b. In the high closure condition, I told participants “In order for 
the booklet to work smoothly for other survey takers, the survey window must be closed 
properly.” Then they proceeded to the next page where they saw a button. They clicked the 
button to close the booklet window and returned to the main survey window. In the low 
closure condition, participants were told “In order for the booklet to work smoothly for 
other survey takers, the survey window must NOT be closed right now… Leave this 
booklet window open and running in the background and simply return to the main survey.” 
After returning to the main survey window, participants answered questions that checked 
whether the closure manipulation was successful. These items were the same as the ones 
used in prior studies (e.g., “I feel ready to move on from the learning experience”). 
 Then, I assigned participants to one of the three conditions varying in how cues 
from the booklet were presented. In two of these conditions, I presented either abstract or 
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concrete cues in the form of a recap session. Specifically, the top of the page read “Recap: 
you have just learned…” In the abstract cue presentation condition, I showed participants 
5 headings, each corresponding to the five different sections of the booklet (e.g., 
“Consumption of Cheese and Health”). In the concrete cue presentation condition, I 
showed participants 5 facts from booklet, taking 1 fact from each 5 sections (e.g., “Cheese 
takes up about 1/10 the volume of the milk it was made from”). The other condition was 
included as a control group. Participants in this condition did not have any “recap” session 
and did not see any cues from the booklet. I included this condition to replicate the basic 
effect of closure found in prior studies. 
As a downstream consequence of subjective knowledge, I asked two questions 
measuring participants’ need for additional information. Specifically, I asked whether they 
would “like to receive cheese recommendations” if they were to bring cheese to a friend’s 
house party, and whether they would be “interested in receiving an additional informational 
brochure about cheese.” These questions were followed by a quiz measuring objective 
knowledge. The quiz was mostly identical to that used in study 2, with only one exception: 
I removed three quiz items that overlapped with the facts presented in the concrete cue 
presentation condition because the answers to these quiz items would have been given 
away from the presented cues in this condition. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Manipulation check 
The closure manipulation was successful. Participants who closed the web browser 
reported feeling a greater sense of closure than those who left the web browser open in the 
background (M = 4.59, SD = 1.05 vs. M = 4.10, SD = 1.15; t(134) = 2.61, p = .01). 
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Objective knowledge 
Participants quiz scores ranged from 2 to 9 out of a total possible score of 9. The 
mean was 5.01 (SD = 1.49) and median was 5. None of the treatments nor their interaction 
predicted participants’ quiz performance (ps > .4). 
External information search 
The two items were strongly correlated (r = .52, p < .0001), and were averaged to 
form a single measure of need for external search. An ANOVA revealed only a significant 
interaction between closure (high closure vs. low closure) and cue-level (abstract vs. 
concrete vs. no-cues), F(1,130) = 3.14, p = .05, figure 2.4. To test the proposed theory, I 
conducted further simple effect analyses. First, I found that the high closure manipulation 
(i.e. closing the web browser) significantly reduced participants’ information search need 
when participants did not see any cues from the booklet (Mclose = 3.75, SDclose = 1.69 vs. 
Mopen = 5.05, SDopen = 1.23; t(44) = 3.02, p < .005). In other words, I conceptually replicated 
the basic effect of closure on subjective knowledge. 
The remaining simple effects analyses examined how cue presentation moderated 
the effect of closure on information search. I theorized that participants who had closure, 
or were somehow able to wrap up the learning experience at a higher level, would 
experience a greater sense of knowledge. Thus, even participants in the low closure 
condition, if they were given abstract cues that summarized their learning, should have a 
heightened sense of subjective knowledge. This prediction was supported. Within the low 
closure condition, compared to participants who did not see any cues (M = 5.05, SD = 
1.23), those who saw abstract cues as a recap of what they learned exhibited a significantly 
lower external search need (M = 4.14, SD = 1.30; t(48) = 2.55, p = .01). Also as predicted, 
these participants (low closure and abstract cues condition) reported a similar information 
search need as those in the high closure and no cue condition (M = 3.75, SD = 1.69; t(38) 
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= .82, p = .42), and the high closure and abstract cues condition (M = 4.55, SD = 1.77; t(41) 
= .87, p = .39). The fact that these three groups showed a similarly lower need for external 
search is consistent with the idea that people feel most knowledgeable when they have a 
summary representation of the event with abstract cues readily available and salient. 
While the findings pertaining to the presentation of abstract cues or no-cues 
(control) support my theory, the pattern is not as consistent for participants exposed to 
concrete cues from the booklet. Supporting my theory that availability of abstract cues is 
needed to feel knowledgeable, within the low closure condition, there was no difference 
between the no-cue (M = 5.05, SD = 1.23) and concrete cues condition (M = 4.75, SD = 
1.73; t(46) = .71, p = .48). Again within the low closure condition, I also predicted that 
participants exposed to concrete cues would feel less knowledgeable and thus seek more 
external information than those exposed to abstract cues. This effect was directionally 
consistent, but not statistically significant (M = 4.75, SD = 1.73 vs. M = 4.14, SD = 1.30; 
t(40) = 1.31, p = .20). Within the high closure condition, I predicted that presenting people 
with concrete cues from the booklet would reduce participants’ reliance on abstract cues 
extracted via the closure process, leading to reduced subjective knowledge and increased 
external search. This effect was also directionally consistent but did not reach statistical 
significance (Mconcrete = 4.26, SDconcrete = 1.82 vs. Mcontrol = 3.75, SDcontrol = 1.69; t(43) = 
.95, p = .35). Presenting concrete cues did not increase external search when compared 
with presenting abstract cues (Mabstract = 4.55, SDabstract = 1.77; t(46) = .55, p = .58). 
Discussion 
Overall, the findings of this study support the proposed theory. The control group 
with only the closure manipulation (no recap session) showed a consistent pattern with 
findings of prior studies. Participants who simply closed the booklet window and 
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experienced a sense of closure were less likely to request further information compared to 
those who left the booklet window open, presumably because they felt more 
knowledgeable. Importantly, providing higher-level summary information in the form of a 
recap session helped participants with low closure feel as knowledgeable as participants 
with high closure who did not have a recap session. In contrast, providing a recap session 
with concrete cues did not help participants with low closure feel more knowledgeable. 
The somewhat inconsistent pattern found in the concrete cue presentation 
conditions could be explained by an overall lower-than-predicted external search need in 
these conditions. The abstract cues in the recap session were only headings (or titles), while 
the concrete cues were actual information taken from the booklet. It may be the case that 
participants in these conditions, because they saw 5 pieces of actual information, felt a 
lower need to engage in additional information search, possibly to avoid information 
overload. An overall lower external search need in the concrete cue conditions would 
explain why I did not find a statistically significant difference between the abstract and 
concrete cue conditions within both high and low closure conditions. On the other hand, if 
there were a generally higher level of external search need in the concrete cue conditions, 
the findings would have confirmed my predictions. 
Alternatively, since the most disconfirming evidence is the low external search (or 
high subjective knowledge) outcome in the high closure and concrete cues condition, it is 
possible that the concrete-cue recap session was not a strong-enough intervention to make 
concrete cues triumph the salience of the abstract cues already extracted through the high 
closure manipulation. In study 3, I was able to draw people’s attention to concrete cues and 
undo the positive effect of closure on subjective knowledge. However, in study 3, the 
concrete cues were presented through a 10-item quiz that participants had to solve, whereas 
in this study, participants simply read 5 facts that were given to them. The former is likely 
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to be a more engaging process than the latter, thus a stronger way to make concrete cues 
more salient than abstract cues. 
Overall, this study provides further insight into the mechanism of how closure 
affects subjective knowledge. I replicated the positive effect of psychological closure on 
subjective knowledge, while also showing that low closure can lead to the same outcome 
as high closure when followed by an abstract summary.  
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Chapter 15: General Discussion 
Six experiments demonstrated how psychological closure on a learning experience 
leads to a heightened sense of subjective knowledge through a mental summarization 
process. Studies 1a and 1b demonstrated the basic effect while providing evidence that 
closure makes gist-level summary information highly available in people’s memory. Study 
2 provides further evidence for this mechanism by showing that the degree of summary 
representation mediates the effect of closure on subjective knowledge. Studies 3-5 also 
examine the proposed mechanism by showing that directing people’s attention to lower-
level details at the point of subjective knowledge estimation attenuates the effect of closure. 
On the other hand, by directing participants’ attention to higher, gist-level information, I 
continued to observe the effects of closure, as I did in studies 1a, 1b, 2, and 3 (T1) in the 
absence of induced higher-level focus. This is consistent with the notion that people tend 
to spontaneously rely on higher-level cues when they are available (Alter et al. 2010; Miller 
1981; Navon 1977; Reyna and Brainerd 1995). Further, I replicated the closure effect and 
made participants in the low closure group feel just as confident as those in the high closure 
group, by presenting summary information (i.e. headlines) to them before subjective 
knowledge assessment (study 6). The robustness of the effect was demonstrated by 
employing various product categories, closure manipulations, and mindset activation 
methods. The effect was also robust against high accuracy motivation. 
THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
As reviewed earlier, the majority of literature on psychological closure examines 
emotional experiences and shows that closure reduces negative emotion (Beike et al. 2007; 
Li et al. 2010). Despite the focus of prior research, I believe that psychological closure is 
experienced or sought after in a broader spectrum of experiences including non-negative 
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and non-emotional domains. This is consistent with research showing that the ending, or 
final moment of a series of events is generally important in both retrospective evaluation 
and future planning (Ariely and Carmon 2000; Loewenstein and Prelec 1993). This 
research is the first to examine the effects of proper endings that provide a sense of closure 
in the context of consumer learning. Thus, I contribute to the psychological closure 
literature in two important ways: first by examining the effect of psychological closure in 
a non-emotional domain (i.e., consumer learning) and second, by discovering cognitive 
consequences of psychological closure, namely, summary representation and heightened 
subjective knowledge. 
The present work also contributes to the subjective knowledge literature by 
revealing psychological closure as a unique determinant. Understanding how to utilize 
closure in order to increase or decrease consumers’ sense of subjective knowledge can be 
applied to many marketing contexts. Marketers may want their customers to feel a high 
sense of closure and a sense of understanding. In this case, to increase satisfaction and 
perceived benefit after an educational program or material, certain procedures can be added 
to facilitate the closure process. Focusing attention to complete aspects, making salient the 
“pastness” of an experience via task-framing, or simply closing the web browser are 
examples used in this research. 
Finally, the present research also makes theoretical contributions to the literature 
on goal pursuit, by providing insight to the subjective experience at the moment of goal 
fulfillment or failure. Fulfilling (vs. failing) learning goals would most likely lead people 
to feel more knowledgeable (Amir and Ariely 2008). The present research shows that, 
beyond actual goal fulfillment, the psychological resolution that allows people to move on 
can also change the way people estimate their knowledge. Even when all participants failed 
to complete their learning (study 1b, study 6), or completed their learning in its entirety 
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from beginning to end (studies 1a, and 2 through 5), a heightened sense of closure led to a 
more summarized representation of the learning experience and greater subjective 
knowledge. Consistent with these results, one could easily find daily examples of closure 
on a failed goal (e.g., moving on from a failed test), or attempts to further enhance feelings 
of closure on an already fulfilled goal (e.g., attending a graduation ceremony). 
Indeed, the moderating effects of individuals’ level of focus (whether it is 
manipulated through a mindset prime, temporal distance manipulation, or presentation of 
concrete cues) highlight the unique cognitive process activated by psychological closure. 
That is, the interaction patterns from studies 3 through 5 clearly demonstrate that the effect 
of closure is diminished once participants adopt a lower-level focus; this is consistent with 
the gist-extraction or summarization mechanism of closure rather than feelings of 
fulfillment. 
While my studies hold actual progress constant, it is likely that completed goals are 
easier to move on from than incomplete ones (Zeigarnik 1927). Thus, an interesting 
extension of my findings would be to examine whether the goal pursuit process (e.g., the 
various means towards the goal) is represented in a more summarized and simplistic 
fashion in retrospect after the goal is fulfilled versus unfulfilled. 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
An interesting area for future research would be to expand the context of learning 
experiences beyond those in the present studies. Many consumer learning experiences are 
structured, such as those provided here (e.g., reading a brochure, taking a class, attending 
a conference). However, the concept of “life lessons” (Beike et al. 2004) highlights the 
possibility of unstructured or unplanned life events also becoming valuable learning 
experiences (e.g., learning from bad decisions). 
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In an everyday consumer setting, for instance, a set of experiences as simple as 
trying food samples at a grocery store or watching TV commercials can be considered a 
learning process. Would a formal act of closing the lid before leaving the food vendor 
create a greater feeling of evaluation certainty? Does the storyline of a TV commercial with 
high or low closure make people feel as if they have a good or poor understanding about 
the advertised product? Many of these questions are worth exploring as consumers’ lives 
are in some way an endless experience of learning about products and brands. 
Furthermore, a meta-analysis conducted by Carlson et al. (2009) found greater 
discrepancy between objective and subjective knowledge for non-products (e.g., medical 
services, health plans) compared to products. The present research only used tangible 
product categories as learning experiences; however, it is possible that closure has an even 
stronger effect after learning about services or more intangible goods. On a related note, it 
is also possible that psychological closure increases subjective knowledge more when the 
subjective knowledge is captured at a general level. This is because individuals may rely 
less on higher level cues when assessing subjective knowledge at a more specific, lower 
level (e.g., the feeling-of-knowing effects regarding concrete facts). 
Finally, the effect of closure on objective knowledge also requires further research. 
It is unclear in which direction and to what extent closure has an effect on objective 
knowledge. Closure is associated with less rumination and recall of emotional details 
(Beike and Wirth-Beaumont 2005). These findings, however, apply to negative and 
emotional experiences where people might have been implicitly motivated to forget 
specific details that upset them. It is unclear whether the same effect will occur when there 
is no affect-driven motivation to forget. While the studies in the present research were not 
designed to specifically answer this question, they display mixed results. Among the four 
studies that used quizzes to test objective knowledge, closure had no effect in three (studies 
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2, 4, & 6), and a somewhat negative effect in one (by interacting with psychological 
distance; study 5). In study 5, closure impaired quiz performance when participants were 
primed with greater psychological distance. Although the result of a single study is 
insufficient to draw conclusions, it is worth mentioning the possibility that psychologically 
moving on from a learning experience could reduce the amount of concrete details 
remembered, while heightening the general feeling of knowledgeableness. 
In conclusion, the present research broadens the way psychological closure is 
conceived in the literature to include not only negative emotional experiences, but also 
non-emotional experiences, such as learning. Specifically, I uncover a previously 
unexplored cognitive consequence of psychological closure, i.e., mental summarization 
and extraction of higher gist-level cues, and show this can heighten subjective knowledge. 
I hope to facilitate future research in this area as psychological closure may be experienced 
and sought after in both emotional (whether positive or negative) and non-emotional 




Consumers’ everyday lives are filled with both big and small events, such as 
enjoying a nice meal at a restaurant, reading wine labels at a store, arguing with a service 
representative, or taking off for an exotic vacation. As one event unfolds after another, 
some consumers may easily “move on” from the previous and fully engage in what is 
happening in the here and now. Others may experience a harder time putting those events 
behind them. My dissertation examines the consequences of moving on, of getting closure. 
What goes on in consumers’ minds when they move on from a past event, and why is this 
relevant to marketers? 
Specifically, my two essays tackle the role of closure on consumers’ cognition, 
emotion, and perception. My first essay shows that, by giving closure on a negative 
consumer event (e.g., a service or product failure), consumers’ negative emotional 
reactions can be weakened, leading to increased psychological distance perceptions. As a 
result, the negative consumer event seems like it happened a longer time ago, and in a 
further away location. Furthermore, the negative consumer event seems less likely to 
happen again in the future, and problems associated with the product seem less prevalent 
as a result of closure. 
My second essay examines the role of closure in the context of consumer learning 
(e.g., reading a brochure about a product) by showing how closure affects cognitive 
representation and subjective knowledge assessments. I find that the experience of closure 
on a learning experience triggers people to wrap up or summarize what they learned at a 
higher level. The salient higher-level cues extracted via closure then lead people to feel a 
heightened sense of knowledgeableness about the learned topic. 
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Moreover, I demonstrate various closure induction techniques across my studies in 
both essays. This was not only to test the robustness of my findings, but also to highlight 
the practical relevance of understanding the role of psychological closure in consumer 
behavior. While psychological closure can be naturally achieved over time, it has also been 
shown to be a malleable, subjective experience that can be experienced as a result of 
external influences. Following prior work (Beike et al. 2007; Beike and Crone 2008), I 
show that people can gain a sense of closure by focusing on the closed (vs. open) aspects 
of an experience, which is a tactic that can be applied when framing messages in 
advertisements and campaigns. Applying and building on prior work related to embodied 
cognition (Gu et al. 2013; Li et al. 2010), I successfully manipulated psychological closure 
by having participants enclose a service complaint letter in an envelope, and also by having 
them close a web browser at the end of their online learning experience. Additionally, I 
developed a task-framing method to enhance participants’ perception that they have moved 
on from the previous experience. 
Prior research on psychological closure has mainly focused on its emotional 
benefits, showing that when people move on from an experience, they tend think about the 
experience less frequently and with less emotional reaction. My dissertation builds on this 
work and expands our current knowledge about how psychological closure affects people. 
I move beyond showing emotional consequences to demonstrate how closure affects 
people’s perceptions of distance and risk (essay 1) and cognitive representation and 
metacognitive self-assessment of knowledge (essay 2). 
I believe psychological closure as a research topic has vast potential for future 
inquiries. For example, people will most likely vary in their ability to move on and in their 
degree of strategic effort they put in to find closure. This suggests that some individuals 
would be more susceptible than others in terms of how much they are influenced by 
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symbolic events and interventions designed to deliver closure (e.g., funerals, graduation 
ceremonies, divorce parties). However, there is not yet an appropriate scale that measures 
this individual difference as a chronic an enduring trait. Developing this scale would not 
only allow us to examine the process of closure more deeply, but it would also help us gain 
a better understanding about other traits and characteristics it is related or unrelated with. 
For example, do people with a high need or ability to achieve closure also have a high need 
for cognitive closure? Are these people better emotion regulators or are they less affected 
by sunk costs or house-money effects in their financial decisions? Having a proper measure 
of psychological closure would help us answer many intriguing questions that remain 
unanswered. 
Another area of future research is to examine the role of closure as a goal or 
motivational drive. All studies in my dissertation either impose high or low feelings of 
closure to participants. However, closure may motivate people to behave in certain ways, 
and one possibility is that closure can determine consumption quantity. Many products and 
services involve multiple parts or sections that are consumed in series. For example, 
television programs have multiple episodes, college courses have multiple lectures, and 
wine-tasting sessions have multiple glasses of wine. In a lot of these cases, there are too 
many consumption units or episodes for a consumer to experience at once. But if a 
consumer starts to engage in these series of episodes, when does she stop? Gestalt 
psychology (Koffka 1922; Köhler 1929; Wertheimer 1912) studies organisms’ tendency to 
perceived global patterns, shapes, and meaning before seeing separate parts, or as Lurie 
and Mason (2007) put it, perceptual sense-making. Therefore, it is plausible that 
completion points of perceived patterns may seem as a natural breaking point during a 
series of consumption episodes because of the associated sense of closure. This has 
implications for product organization and presentation (e.g., how many products are 
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displayed in each row). Moreover, the notion of constructed satiation, that satiation can be 
affected by subjective experience rather than objective consumption amount (Redden and 
Galak 2010), hints at the possibility that closure can enhance feelings of satiation. 
These are only some general directions for future research, as the possibility of 
future research in this area seems abundant. I look forward to continued investigation of 
this topic to better understand the cognitive, emotional, perceptual, and motivational 
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Figure 1.6a: Negative emotion associated with product depending on the extent to which 
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Figure 1.6b: Effect of psychological closure manipulation on probabilistic distance 
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Table 2.1: Correlations (Pearson’s R) between experienced closure, perceived 
cohesiveness, and subjective knowledge 












.28 (p = .01) .41 (p < .001) .38 (p < .01) .42 (p < .01) 
Perceived 
Cohesiveness 
– .41 (p < .001) – .31 (p < .01) 
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